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I.

INTRODUCT1ON

Landsat, the United States civil remote-sensing satellite program,
was originally a research and development program. The program was
organized to develop advanced remote-sensing instruments and related
technology so that satellites orbiting the globe could observe and monitor
natural resources. The data derived from remote-sensing have proved to
be extremely valuable in oil and mineral exploration, water management,
mapmaking and other geophysical endeavors. Remote-sensing devices
on Landsat satellites collect and measure energy emitted by the Earth, its
geological components, flora, water areas, etc. The detected energy is
then quantified and multiplexed so that discrete data can be transformed
by data processing equipment into a relevant, visual depiction of the
sensed areas-similar to an aerial photograph.
The current Landsat system consists of two polar orbiting satellites:
Landsat 4, launched in July 1982, and Landsat 5, launched in March
1984. Each spacecraft orbits the Earth at an altitude of 705 kilometers
and consists of the standard National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Multimission Modular Spacecraft' and an instrument
module unique to the mission. The instrument module carries two types
of remote-sensing devices: the Thematic Mapper' and the Multispectral
1. The Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) includes the attitude (angle of flight)
control, communications equipment, data handling and power subsystems and a propulsion
module.
2. The thematic mapper is a seven-band multispectral, high resolution scanning device.
The picture elements for the thematic mapper are 30x30 square meters for all bands except the
thermal infrared which projects a ground image of 120x120 square meters. It collects, filters

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol, 7

Scanner.3 Additionally, the module carries a wideband communications
subsystem, high-gain and other antennae, and a solar panel array capable

of generating two kilowatts of power. Each spacecraft is designed for a
three-year mission life and can be retrieved by the Space Shuttle. The

Landsat ground system is located in Greenbelt, Maryland. It includes
the Mission Management Facility, a Control and Simulation Facility,
Image Generation Facility, Transportable Ground Station and Landsat
Assessment System.4

After President Carter assigned jurisdiction over all operational civil
remote-sensing activities to the National Oceanographic and Atmos-

pheric Administration (NOAA), he established a three-part structure to
serve remote-sensing activities. The goal of this structure was to promote

operation of civil land remote-sensing activities by the private sector
through the following activities: (1) integration of civilian operational

activities under NOAA; (2) joint or coordinated civil/military activities
where feasible; and (3) separate defense activities which have no civilian
counterpart.5 Early in 1981 President Reagan sped up the timetable on
the transfer of remote-sensing activities to the private sector. On March

8, 1983, he announced his intention to transfer the civil operational remote-sensing satellites, including both Landsats and Metsats, to the private sector.6

The proposed commercialization of the United States civil remotesensing satellite system, including the Landsat program, presents a com-

plex series of competing international law and foreign policy consideraand detects radiation from the Earth in a swath 185 kilometers (115 miles) wide, then quantifies
and multiplexes signals from its detectors into a serial data stream (one bit wide) for
transmission.
3. The MSS has been the primary Earth-observing instrument on Landsat spacecraft,
The MSS is a radiometer that collects and measures energy reflected or emitted in discrete
intervals of the electromagnetic spectrum. It has four spectral bands in the visible and nearinfrared portions of the spectrum. The picture elements of the MSS are 80x80 meters square,
when projected on the ground from the Landsat orbit. It too collects, filters and detects radiation from the earth in a swath 185 kilometers (115 miles) wide, then quantifies and multiplexes
signals from its detectors into a serial data stream (one bit wide) for transmission.
4. For a more detailed description of all facets of the Landsat system and remote-sensing
technology see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRANSFER OF THE CIVIL OPERATIONAL
EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1983), reprinted in The Con.

mercializationof MeteorologicalandLand Remote-Sensing Satellites: HearingsBefore the Sub.
comm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on
Space Science andApplications, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 751-927 (1983) [hereinafter cited as LRS
Act Hearing].
5. Announcement of the President's Decision Concerning Land Remote Sensing Activities, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2149 (Nov. 20, 1979).
6. POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE, S.

REP. No.102, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SENATE SPACE REPORT].
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tions.7 From the standpoint of international law, land remote-sensing

cannot be labeled exclusively an outer space activity or exclusively a terrestrial activity. From a foreign policy perspective, commercialization of

remote-sensing would pose a dilemma: NOAA can either retain exclusive ownership and control over a publicly-owned remote-sensing program (which plays a role in productive political relations between the
United States and developing countries) or turn the program over to a
private undertaking with uncertain chances of success. In addition, po-

tential commercial owner/operators must determine whether required
compliance with existing and future United States treaties and laws is

compatible with a successful commercial venture.
This Article examines the international law and policy aspects of the
proposed transfer of the remote-sensing program to private parties. This

examination focuses on the public solicitation by the United States Department of Commerce entitled "Request for Proposals for Transfer of

the United States Land Remote Sensing Program to the Private Sector"
and the recently enacted Landsat Act,9 which is intended "to promote
the use of remote-sensing satellite data."° Many of the international law
and policy issues are discussed in a summary manner in the "International and Foreign Policy Considerations" section of the RFP,1 1 the
House of Representatives Hearing on the International Implications of
7. There is little doubt that the Reagan Administration intends to commercialize the
operation and management of the United States Landsat system unless precluded by Congress.
The characterization of the commercialization as "proposed" reflects the internecine warfare
within the Commerce Department between those for and those against Comsat's proposal to
gain legal title to Landsat and the weather satellite systems Metsat and Geosat. Comsat is a
private, federally chartered corporation whose principal activity is satellite telecommunications. There was an immediate media and Congressional backlash over the inclusion of the
weather satellites. To complicate matters, conflict of interest allegations were lodged against
Deputy Secretary of Commerce Guy W. Fiske for allegedly discussing employment possibilities with Comsat representatives. He ultimately resigned. As a result, the RFP operates under
the assumption of a proposed commercialization.
8. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR TRANSFER OF THE

UNrrED STATES LAND REMOTE SENSING PROGRAM TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, (Jan. 3, 1984)
(hereinafter cited as RFP). An earlier version of the RFP, Department of Commerce, Draft.
Request for the Transfer of United States Civil Remote Sensing Satellites to the PrivateSector
(October 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Draft RFP], contained proposals for the transfer of the
Landsat system along with the polar orbiting Metsats and geostationary Metsats (weather remote-sensing satellites). Since. then, the Metsats have been excluded, and the revised REP was
prepared.
9. Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-365, 98 Stat.
451 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Landsat Act].
10. Id
11. R.P, supra note 8, § VIL6.
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Proposed Sale of Landsat Satellite 2 and related federal agency reports.

This Article begins by examining existing international law related to
land remote-sensing. It then examines the issues raised by the proposed
transfer of civil land remote-sensing operations to the private sector in
light of the RFP and the Landsat Act, including the viewpoints of devel-

oping countries and potential commercial owner/operators. 13 After discussing the great disparity in opinions, this Article recommends that an
international regime govern land remote-sensing activities until a final
United States or United Nations regime is articulated. 4
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REQUEST FOR
PROPOSALS
The stated goal of the Request for Proposals (RFP) is for the United

States "to establish a commercial [United States] civil operational landobserving [remote-sensing] satellite program . . . [for which the] ulti-

mate objective is to purchase data, over the counter, from a self-sustaining commercial operation."'" The scope of the proposal is two-fold:
12. International Implications of Proposed Sale of Landsat Satellite: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. on Legislation and NationalSecurity of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as LandsatHearing].
13. One of the inherent difficulties in conducting the research for this Article as an academician "outsider" is that much of the available information was either classified, privileged or
proprietary. Security classification limitations materially affected research relating to national
security considerations but the releasable general information proved sufflcient. Matters of
privilege limited direct attribution of quotes by government representatives without any
significent detrimental impact. Limits on access to proprietary information proved the most
burdensome. Since potential bidders have to attach a dollar figure to the cost of complying
with United States treaties and laws, their specific methods of dealing with these matters was
considered proprietary and therefore not releasable information. This dilemma affected the
portion of this Article dealing with the effect of adherence to the open skies doctrine upon the
commercial viability of private sector land remote-sensing ventures, but only to the extent that
hard data was unavailable to support general statements.
14. Currently, land remote-sensing is operated in an international law void because of the
failure of a United Nations Working Group on remote-sensing principles to agree even on
basic definitions. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. From a domestic law standpoint, the issue of commercializing civil land remote-sensing stirred from several years of inaction and began to respond to the challenge at a fast pace during the preparation of this Article.
Every attempt has been made, especially in portions relating to legislative initiatives, to anticipate future developments and discuss all provisions related to international law and policy
issues. The pending Landsat Act on private-sector land remote-sensing, as separately passed
by the House and Senate and redrafted into a single contiguous conference committee proposal, may be enacted into law prior to publication. Once the final draft is agreed upon, the
conferees expect swift passage in Congress, as well as an equally rapid signing of the Act into
law by the President. The language quoted in this Article from the conferee's draft Landsat
Act, however, is not expected to be modified in any significant manner in the final draft.
15. RFP, supra note 8, at i.
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(1) a service contract for the transfer of operation and management (but

not ownership) of the existing United States Landsat program; and (2) a
commercial contract for the development and operation of a "follow-on

commercial system."

6

Although the two contract proposals will be con-

sidered separately, a contract proposal based on continued government
ownership of Landsat 4/5 will not be considered unless a proposed follow-on system is privately owned and operated. 7 The contract duration
provision considers the lifespan of the current Landsat system through
Landsat 5, development time to "build and launch a follow-on commercial system," and a "reasonable period of operation of the follow-on commercial system to permit market development."1 8 The RFP is limited by

the requirement in the NASA Authorization Act of 1984 that, prior to
any transfer, the Secretary of Commerce must present to Congress a
comprehensive statement of the final transfer proposal and "Congress
[must] thereafter [enact] a law which contains such policies, procedures,
"19
conditions, or limitations. . . as it deems appropriate ....

It is important to highlight the fact that the RFP is structured primarily to "elicit proposals for a commercial operational land remote-

sensing satellite system to begin operation after the present Government
There is a fundamental difference between the present situation and that envisaged
for the future. Today the government (sic) owns the satellite data. In the future, a
commercial operator would own the raw data produced by the commercial satellite
system. The Government would buy data from the owner/operator and further process and use the data for its own specified purposes.
Id.
16. RFP, supra note 8, § II.11. For the follow-on system, "[a]n offeror must propose a
satellite system, ground control system and data preprocessing system. Also required [for both
systems] are the market development procedures and plans to ensure that commercialization is
feasible and the business will become self supporting at the earliest timeY" Id. at i. In order for
a bid to be "responsive," a "proposal must clearly show the plans, elements and development
requirements of the total commercial system in sufficient detail to be judged as to reasonableness and cost." Id. § VII.1.6. The same section assigns specific levels of ialue in determining
responsiveness of certain portions of the proposals; "[o]f particular importance is the proposed
relationship and procedures for satisfying the National Security and international requirements:" the methods of developing a commercial market are of "high importance;" and plans
to "minimize any gap in data continuity between the current government system and the initial
commercial system are of interest." Id.
17. RFP, supra note 8, § 111.7. Under the section on "Technical Requirements," a bid
need not include operation and maintenance of the Landsat 4/5 space and ground components
to be responsive. If, however, the bid includes the Landsat 4/5 system, "certain benefits may
accrue to a contractor and prove advantageous to both the contractor and the Government.... Such a bid is highly encouraged." Id. § VII.1.6.
18. Id. § Ill.12.
19. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L
No. 98-52, 97 Stat. 281, 285-286 (1983); see also RFP,supra note 8, at i.
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[Landsat] system."2 The RFP does not take the position that the
United States has a monopoly on remote-sensing. Instead, private
United States entities are free to pursue gathering of raw land remotesensing data outside the RFP process. 2 Accordingly, it is necessary to
digress slightly to answer an obvious following question: If private operators are free to launch their own satellites and gather data outside the
RFP, why bid at all? The answer lies in an anticipated cost advantage to
be gained through the RFP. What will be available to an operator
through the RFP is that the RFP offeror will be asked to "specify plans
to coordinate with and take full advantage of the continuing Research &
Development programs of the Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA
and other Federal agencies involved in remote-sensing research."2 2 Unfortunately, this research and development (R&D) support-or any
other manner of support, including guaranteed minimum purchase provisions-is not specified or quantified in the RFP.23
Given the highly speculative nature of a private remote-sensing venture and assuming the possibility of substantial government R&D support and data purchase guarantees, there is a strong economic incentive
for a potential operator to consider initiating a remote-sensing operation
through the RFP prior to an unsubsidized, totally private operation. Additionally, the Landsat Act requires federal agencies to reimburse the
system operator for "additional or development costs" associated with
"technical modifications imposed on a system operator on the basis of
20. RFP, supra note 8, at i.
21. This does not mean that they can operate in the absence of regulation by the United
States. The Landsat Act contains provisions which would regulate the activities of private
remote-sensing operators. See infra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
22. RFP, supra note 8, § V.3. The United States will "[p]rovide appropriate logistical,
technical and financial support in accordance with the contract, while the contractor is developing the commercial markets necessary to ensure a self-sustaining operation." Id. § 1.5(b).
23. The extent of R&D support is questionable. Section V.7 of the RFP states in part:
However, depending upon the nature of the specific agreement between the parties,
the results of particular Government-funded research efforts may or may not be in
the public domain. While commercial operators should seek to remain abreast of
current research, they should not assume that award of a contract resulting from this
RFP will provide them with any special access to research results not available to
other firms.
Moreover, the extent to which an RFP-designated commercial system operator can rely
upon purchases of data by the United States is uncertain. The only specific requirements are
that an operator of the present government Landsat system must provide 50 thematic mapper
plus 200 MSS scenes (images) per day and the operator of a follow-on commercial system must
deliver MSS equivalency or better scenes as required. Id. § V, art. XLI. Moreover, "the Government does not intend to limit itself to buying data and/or services from only the successful
Offeror under [the RFP]." Id. at ii.
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national security concerns."'2 4 To the extent that government support is
lacking, international data availability may suffer from higher data prices
in an effort by the commercial operator to obtain sufficient revenues to
realize an acceptable rate of return on his investment.

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REQUEST FOR
PROPOSALS
Since the United States government has been the primary Landsat
data user, many of its uses have both national security and foreign policy

implications. Accordingly, any offeror must be a "U.S. firm as specified
in the solicitation." 25 The RFP contemplates, however, that the United
States government will not be the most important customer for remotesensing data in the future. As a result,
the international specifications on how a commercial operator will do
business are not strictly limited to past government practices. However, the operator is encouraged to continue with practices now used
by the Federal government vis-a-vis [Landsat] data. Should he wish to
change this mode of operation, Government approval is required.2 6
Furthermore, it is "of particular importance that a 'responsive' proposal
clearly set out 'the proposed relationship and procedures for satisfying
the National Security and international requirements of [the RFP].' "I

Section VII.6 of the RFP sets forth three general categories which
any proposal for commercialization of remote-sensing must address:
(1) conformity with applicable laws, including treaty obligations and ex-

port control legislation; (2) data availability for international use; and
(3) expected relations with foreign Landsat ground station operators.28

Section VII.8 specifies minimum "International Requirements" which
24. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 607(c).
25. RFP, supra note 8, § 111.5. Generally, this provision defines a United States firm on
the basis of: (1) its place of business; (2) its place of incorporation; (3) the citizenship of its
corporate officers, key management and supervisory personnel and principle shareholders; and
(4) the filing of corporate tax returns in the United States. Subsection 5(d) states that:
Foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI) will be considered to exist when the
degree of ownership, control, or influence over an offeror/bidder or a contractor by a
foreign interest is such that a reasonable basis exists for concluding the compromise
of classified information or unclassified sensitive information may result.
26. RFP, supra note 8, at ii.
27. See id. § VII.1.6; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. National security
requirements are beyond the scope of this Article. Although they do have some relation to
foreign policy, those portions of the RFP dealing with national security are classified as secret
and cannot be released to the public on a routine basis.
28. RFP, supra note 8, § VII.6.
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every proposal must address to be considered acceptable.29 This includes
proposals for operation and/or acquisition of the current Landsat sys-

tem,30 as well as proposals for follow-on commercial systems.31 Section
111. 1 specifies oversight roles for the Department of Commerce, the Department of State and other relevant agencies 32 and provides for the cre-

ation of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the
international and foreign policy considerations.3 3
29. Id. §§ VII.8.1, VII.8.2.
30. Id. § VII.2.3. International Requirements:
The proposal shall address the manner in which the U.S. Government will obtain
data for its international space technology assistance and other programmatic needs,
This shall include as a minimum the procedures planned for operation of current and
future [Landsat] ground stations as well as any proposed modifications to the status
of existing foreign [Landsat] stations.
For proposals that contemplate operation and control of the present [Landsat 5] system, little opportunity or time will remain for major changes in the system configuration for commercial purposes. The routine utilization of TDRSS for data recovery
and expected increased use of thematic mapper-type data by foreign users might permit some modifications of data distribution and data recovery procedures. A proposal for operation of the [Landsat 5] system shall address the procedures for
continuation or change in foreign acquisition of data; proposed changes, either technical or fiscal, to the established MOU's [Memoranda of Understanding] between
NOAA and foreign [Landsat] ground station operators; and changes, if any, to methods for recovery of data and subsequent distribution to all users.
31. Id. § VII.8.1.10. International Requirements:
Each proposal shall include the plans and procedures to address foreign policy issues
and international obligations. As a minimum, the proposal shall address when and
how the proposer will provide the required notifications or requests for approval/
disapproval, as well as the approach and organization for interface with foreign entitites, the U.S. Government and other satellite operators. The proposal must also address plans and policies for international data sale and distribution. Offerors may, at
their option, suggest ways and means by which the present international network of
foreign [Landsat] ground receiving stations may be continued throughout the life of
the contract.
32. Id. § III.l. Government Oversight:
(4) Questions concerning the obligations imposed, or compliance with the obligations, in the International Commitments and National Security sections of [the] RFP
will . . . be handled through the Contracting Officer . . . [t]he [Executive Branch
regulatory] agency or department will provide the Department of Commerce with
the guidance or decision that is to be passed on to the operator of [the Landsat or
follow-on] systems.
33. Id. § III.(c). "(1) It is expected that the legislation authorizing the program will
provide legal procedures to protect the interests of the U.S. including authorizing the Secretary
of Commerce to impose civil penalties for noncompliance with the national security and international commitment requirements set forth in this RFP." Id.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF REMOTESENSING
A. Applicable Treaties and Laws
There are three specific international agreements which each RFP
offeror must consider in his proposal: (1) the Space Treaty of 1967,1
which makes member states responsible for all activities in outer space
conducted by its nationals, regardless of governmental or nongovernmental ownership; (2) the 1973 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects3" (Liability Convention), which makes
member governments liable for any damage to persons or property
caused by any space object under its registration, regardless of governmental or nongovernmental ownership; and (3) the 1976 Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 36 (Registration Convention), which requires all member states to notify appropriate international authorities, as soon as practicable, of objects launched into outer
space by its nationals, regardless of ownership. Offerors must also comply with the Arms Export Control Act 37 and the Export Administration
Act.38 In addition to existing treaties and laws, "[o]fferors shall agree to
comply with all.

. .

future treaties and laws throughout the life of the

contract or the proposal will be considered unacceptable. '39 Finally,
prior United States approval or concurrence is required "on all matters
34. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as Space Treaty of 1967]. The portion of the Space Treaty
of 1967 referred to in the RFP is Article VI, which reads:
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and
for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions
set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities
are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an
international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be
borne both by the international organization and by the State Parties to the Treaty
participating in such organization.
35. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter cited as Liability Convention].
36. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,
128 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 [hereinafter cited as Registration Convention].
37. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2778 (1982).
38. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1979). Extended funding for fiscal year 1984
authorized by Pub. L. No. 98-108, 97 Stat. 744 (1983).
39. RFP, supra note 8, § VI.l.
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involving overall [United States] space and export control policies, and
international treaty obligations." 4 This provision also requires the operator to give the United States thirty days notice prior to "negotiations
with foreign governments, agencies, or business entities, as well as international bodies, so that the [United States] Government may provide advice and grant approval as necessary, regarding relevant foreign
policy."41
B.

The United Nations Working Group on Remote-Sensing

Even in the absence of a formal treaty to which the United States is
a party, there is a substantial body of United Nations discussions and
proposed principles on remote-sensing generated by the United Nations
Working Group on Remote Sensing (Working Group). Tentative agreement has been reached within the Working Group on nine of the proposed principles.42 Remote-sensing must "be carried out for the benefit
and interests of all countries" according to Principle II." Principle III
requires remote-sensing to be conducted in accordance with international
law.' Principle IV stresses international cooperation.4 5 Principle V promotes the identification and sharing of information "useful for the prevention of phenomena detrimental to the natural environment of the
[E]arth."' 46 Principle VI requires remote-sensing states to "make available technical assistance to other interested states on mutually agreed
terms." 47 Principle VII advocates a United Nations role in coordinating
and promoting remote-sensing of the Earth, along with a notice provi40. Id. § VI.1.1.
41. Id.; see also Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 402(b)(6). For a detailed history and cxpanded analysis of remote-sensing issues see CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 720-764 (1982); REIJNEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OUTER SPACE 93-113 (1977);
Gorove, CurrentIssues of Space Law Before the U.N., 11 J. SPACE L. 6 (1983); Gotleib, The
TransborderFlow ofInformation by Communicationsand ComputerSystems: Issues and Guiding Principles,68 AM. J.INT'L L. 227 (1974); Hopkins, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing
of Earth Resources by Satellite, 78 MIL. L. REv. 57 (1977); Jasentuliyana, Review of the Work
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 11 J. SPACE L. 125
(1983); Krafft, In Search ofa Legal Frameworkfor the Remote Sensing of the Earthfrom Outer
Space, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453 (1981).
42. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/320, Appendix A (1983) [hereinafter cited as Principles]. Since
agreement has not been reached on the issue of whether the Principles are legally binding, each
of the nine Principles is prefaced in the alternatives of "shall" or "should."
43. Id. at 16-17.
44. Id. at 17. International law, for purposes of this Principle, includes the Charter of the
United Nations, the Space Treaty of 1967 and "relevant instruments" of the International
Telecommunications Union.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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sion.48 Principle VIII requires that states which become aware of an im-

pending natural disaster through their remote-sensing activities make the
matter known as promptly as possible to states likely to be affected.4 9

Principle X asks states to provide technical information on operational
systems to other nations, particularly developing nations." Finally,
under Principle XVI "remote-sensing of the [E]arth (should) (shall) be
conducted with respect for the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all states and peoples over their own wealth and natural
51
resources."
One of the stumbling blocks to agreement upon the remaining eight
principles is the failure of the Working Group to agree upon basic definitions in Principle I, such as "remote-sensing of the Earth," "analyzed

information" and "primary data." There is controversy over whether a
distinction should be made between "primary [raw] data" and "analyzed
[value added] data.""2 What is needed is a functional approach to determining the legal issues involved. Several functional categorization
schemes draw various distinctions between the act of remote-sensing and
the use of the resulting picture;

3

between data and information;' and

48. Id. at 17. Principle VII equates the notice requirements for land remote-sensing to
those required for other space activities in Article XI of the Space Treaty of 1967, supra note
34, whereby states report their outer space activities to the Secretary General, "to the greatest
extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities:'
49. Principles, supra note 42, at 18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20. Language within this principle which has juridical effects is not agreed
upon. Each of three versions recognizes state sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources. One version would also recognize sovereignty over "information concerning these
resources;" another version seeks recognition of a state's "inalienable right to dispose of [its]
natural resources;" and the third version requires "due regard [be given] to the rights and
interests of other States and their natural and juridical persons in accordance with international law." Id.
52. Id. at 16.
(b) The term "primary data" means those primary data which are acquired by
satellite-borne remote sensors and transmitted from a satellite either by telemetry in
the form of electromagnetic signals or physically in any form such as photographic
film or magnetic tape, as well as preprocessed products derived from those data
which may be used for later analysis;
(c) The term "analyzed information" means the end-product resulting from the
analytical process performed on the primary data as defined in paragraph (b) above
combined with data and/or knowledge obtained from sources other than satelliteborne remote sensors.
53. REUNEN, supra note 41, at 96-97 (citing Dr. Franco Florio, former Chairman of the
LRS Working Group). He finds that the Space Treaty of 1967 treats the "act" of land remotesensing as a harmless activity which does not prohibit the use or dissemination of the data.
54. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/171, Annex 3, at 4 (1976). The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space identified six
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between earth resources (which should be subject to earth laws) and
space resources (which should be subject to space laws)." There is also a

comprehensive approach which does not focus on the information gathered (e.g., natural resource information) but instead attempts to define
permissible activities within various strata of the atmosphere. 56 Under
this "delimitation of space" approach, the focus is on the extraterrestrial
location of the sensing activity-not the terrestrial location of the object

of its activity.
The sentiments expressed in Principles II, III and IX are similar.
Principle IX requires the sensing state to use the sensed data "in a manner compatible with the legitimate rights and interests of other states." 57

Principle IX is considered somewhat redundant in view of Principles II
and III; it assigns international responsibility for remote-sensing activities to the remote-sensing states.58 Although this provision would fill the
legal void in the Space Treaty of 1967 as to remote-sensing activities, no
consensus could be reached within the Working Group. 59 Principle XII

provides for nondiscriminatory access to "primary data," similar to the
United States policy. The conferees, however, could not reach a consensus on Principle XII language; whether the sensed state should have open
and equal access, a right of first refusal or a right to prevent transfer to a
third state.6"

Principles XIII, XIV and XV are the most controversial provisions.
Generally, each requires the sensing state to obtain some form of "prior
consent" from the sensed state in order to conduct specified remote-sens-

ing activities. Prior to commencing the sensing activities, the sensing
structural aspects of remote-sensing, labeling (1)-(4) as "data" matters and (5)-(6) as "information" matters: "(1) Data acquisition (satellites and command stations); (2) Data reception
(antennas and receivers); (3) Data pre-processing (formatting and recording); (4) Data storage
and dissemination (archiving and reproduction); (5) Data analysis (interpretation or user
processing); (6) Information utilization (practical applications by users.)" Id. at 8.
55.

REIJNEN,

supra note 41, at 96.

56. REUJNEN, supra note 41, at 97-98 (citing Prof. Galloway). Galloway frames her argument from a viewpoint of "up looking down; not down looking up." In support of her focus
on defining the boundaries of aerospace, near space and outer space, she looks to the nature of
the activity to be conducted within the various strata, instead of the locus of the activity. She
points out paradoxically that remote-sensing from a balloon or aircraft, without prior consent,
would violate aerospace treaties; whereas the same activity conducted from outer space is legal
under the Space Treaty of 1967. She concludes that land remote-sensing cannot be pigeonholed into the Space Treaty of 1967, and that, in fact, no international legal guidelines exist,
57. Principles, supra note 42, at 18.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Krafft, supra note 41, at 465.
60. Principles, supra note 42, at 19.
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state must notify the sensed state under Principle XIII61 and consult with
the sensed state under Principle XIV.62 Principle XV is the most controversial; after the sensed data is gathered, the sensing state must obtain
consent prior to disseminating the data to "third states, international organizations, public or private entities." 6 Some argue that Principle XV

does not prohibit the space activity but rather attempts to restrict the
dissemination of the gathered data. This is in direct opposition to the
nondiscriminatory access aspect of the open skies doctrine, 64 which attempts to negate attempts to sequester data and favor one purchaser to

the detriment of another. 6 The last unresolved principle is Principle
XVII, which provides a dispute resolution procedure which stresses
peaceful resolution of disputes through "prompt consultation among the

parties."'66 Its implementation has been held in abeyance pending resolution of the controversy discussed above.
C.

The Open Skies Doctrine

The basis for a state's power to exclude anyone or anything from
passing through or over its territory is its ability to exercise complete
61. Id. Principle XIII provides:
A State intending to conduct or conducting activities and/or programmes for remote-sensing of the earth from outer space shall notify promptly the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the nature, estimated duration of the programme, and
the geographic area covered as well as any major modification of the programme.
The Secretary-General shall immediately disseminate the information thus received
to the States concerned and shall publish it accordingly. A State conducting activities and/or programmes for remote sensing of the earth from outer space should also
furnish such information to the extent practicable directly to any State which so
requests.
With respect to the words "or conducting," reference should be made to paragraph 21 of the
Working Group Chairman's Report at the twenty-second (1983) session of the SubCommittee.
62. Id. Principle XIV provides:
A State carrying out remote-sensing of the earth shall without delay consult with a
State whose territory is sensed upon request of the latter in regard to such activity [im
particular dissemination of data and information], in order to promote international
co-operation, friendly relations among States and to enhance the mutual benefits to
be derived from this activity.
63. Id. at 20. Principle XV provides:
States carrying out remote-sensing of the earth shall not, without the approval of the
States whose territories are affected by these activities, disseminate or dispose of any
data or information on the natural resources of these States to third States, international organizations, public or private entities.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
65. For a discussion of the "open skies" doctrine, see infra notes 66-83 and accompanying
text.

66. Principles, supra note 42, at 20.
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sovereignty over its territory to the exclusion of all others. It was decided early, when human exploration of outer space became feasible, that
it was in the best interests of all nations to preserve the territory of outer
space as the "province of all mankind."67 As a result, "[oluter Space
. . . is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means." 68 Since there were
no limits on the authority to travel through this "new" territory, "free
access to all areas of celestial bodies" was granted, along with the "freedom of scientific investigation in outer space."' 69 These principles came
to be understood by the United States and most other nations as allowing
them to place satellites into orbit with "unrestricted overflight" over the
underlying earth territories. The principle of "unrestricted overflight"
became commonly known as the "open skies" doctrine.
As the prospect of an operational Landsat land remote-sensing satellite became clearer, the validity of the open skies doctrine was challenged. The challenge arose because the focus of the Landsat outer space
activity was directed not towards outer space but towards land under the
exclusive control of sovereign states.70 Complicating matters was the
later-confirmed suspicion of United States use of "spy in the sky" satellites for military reconnaissance. 71 A vigorous international debate ensued. According to those who relied on a restrictive interpretation of the
Space Treaty of 1967 (i.e., one can conduct only those activities authorized by the Treaty), its principles should be viewed as limiting the scope
of the freedom of exploration in outer space to objects and phenomena in
outer space. Others, relying on a permissive reading of the Space Treaty
of 1967 (i.e., one can conduct any activity not prohibited by the Treaty)
simply cited the absence of any prohibition against activities such as remote-sensing by satellites.
The United States made a policy decision to "blunt criticism that
might otherwise have resulted from its extensive use of military reconnaissance and other satellites ' 72 by making all data from Landsat, its
67. Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 34, art. I.
68. Id. art. II.

69. Id. art. I.
70. For a discussion of legal categorization of remote-sensing activity see supra notes 4560 and accompanying text.
71. For many years, even the "fact" of the existence of strategic military reconnaissance
satellites was highly classified. In October 1978 President Carter first publicly acknowledged
their existence. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion: A Technical Memorandum 93 (March 1984) [hereinafter
cited as OTA Memorandum].
72. Id. at 32.
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civil land remote-sensing satellite system, available to all potential purchasers on an equal, nondiscriminatory basis, regardless of nationality or
political persuasion. This nondiscriminatory access aspect73 of the open
skies doctrine also accomplished a secondary purpose in that its sole basis was not in outer space law, but also included the free flow of information language of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 4 As
such, it reinforced the United States commitment to share information
and technology with the developing world, telegraphed a powerful
message to governments opposed to the open interchange of ideas and
information and improved United States diplomatic standing with the
developing countries.7 5
For over a decade, the central feature of the United States Landsat
policy has been nondiscriminatory access to remote-sensing data. As a
tangible manifestation of the United States concern over the potential of
Landsat to "derive and exploit exclusive information concerning the natural resources of lesser developed countries," Congress took the following steps to "mute international efforts to restrain land remote-sensing
' 76
from space:
(a) Declared that Landsat data were available to anyone who wished to
use them. To implement this policy a central depository for all United
States processed data was established at the EROS Data Center and data

was sold to any person or nation without discrimination;
(b) Promoted and encouraged other nations to build and operate their
own facilities to receive and process Landsat data, and agreed to turn on

their transmitters (subject to technical limitations) whenever the satellite
73. From a functional standpoint, the issue of nondiscriminatory access to land remotesensing data should be considered separately from the "open skies" doctrine. Most individuals, however, do not make such a subtle distinction. Accordingly, they view the accommodating mechanism of "open, nondiscriminatory access" as part and parcel of the "open skies"
doctrine. See, eg., Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 601(a). Those states which support the current version of the "open skies" doctrine have no real concern over whether their land remotesensing data provider is a private entity or a government agency as long as they continue to
receive nondiscriminatory access to the data. Landsat Hearin&supra note 12, at 65 (statement
of Dr. Nyle C. Brady, Senior Assistant Administrator for Science and Technology, Agency for
International Development).
74. G.A. Res. 217A (II), U.N. GAOR II1.1, U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948), art. 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless offrontiers." (emphasis added).
75. See The President's Report to Congress on Science, Technology and American Diplomacy for Fiscal Year 1982, cited in OTA Memorandum, supra note 71, at 31, which states in
part that "[i]n remote-sensing the readily available products of United States meteorological
and land satellites are used routinely by the world community. The result has been a large
measure of good will and support for our positions in the U.N. and other international form"
76. RFP, supra note 8, § VI.2.
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was within range of such foreign ground stations in exchange for a yearly
access fee;

(c) Further encouraged regional distribution of Landsat data by making
it a condition of the agreement to turn on the satellite's transmitter over
a foreign ground station that these stations would also distribute

processed data to other nations without restriction;
(d) Encouraged participation of foreign nations in United States research programs and in some cases funded research by foreign nationals

and provided financial support for operational applications demonstrations. Scientists and technicians from developing nations were trained to
understand the use of Landsat data and to support research or eco-

nomic/social objectives of each interested nation;
(e) Set fees to purchase Landsat data from the EROS Data Center at
marginal cost of reproduction. This permitted poorer nations to
purchase and use Landsat data; and

(f) Established an informal arrangement with France, Japan and the European Space Agency through the Coordination on Land Observing
Satellites to coordinate international research and development and maxin land remote-sensing. 77

imize commonality of technical parameters
During the hearing on the Landsat Act, the question of whether the
open skies doctrine should be perpetuated in a private Landsat system

remained unresolved. On the one hand, there are those who regard the
Landsat program as the cornerstone of the open skies doctrine because of
the related United States commitment to nondiscriminatory access to acquired data.7 8 On the other hand, there are those who argue that there is

no requirement in international law to provide nondiscriminatory access
to data. They assert that the current United States espousal of the non77. See id. § V.3:
It is the U.S. Government's strong belief that an aggressive, continuing federal R&D
effort in advanced remote sensing technology, as well as to advancing the understanding of changes to global earth processes and their long-term impacts [is important]. In that regard, it is important that the offeror specify plans to coordinate with
and take full advantage of the continuing R&D programs of NASA, NOAA, DOD,
and other Federal agencies involved in remote-sensing research.
It has been NASA's practice in the past to exchange operational remote-sensing data with
foreign governments for "ground truth" support (verifying the existence of conditions sensed
by the remote-sensing detectors) and foreign satellite data. Remote-sensing data collected by
NASA will made available to the public at its incremental cost. Id. app. B-3, 4. Remotesensing data exchanged between domestic and foreign investigators will be at "no cost," Id.
§ V.6. "Proposals should demonstrate an awareness of [R&D] uses of remotely sensed data."
Id. § V.4.
78. Landsat Hearing,supra note 12, at 5 (statement of Dr. John B. Gibbons, director,
Office of Technology Assessment, National Security Council [hereinafter cited as Gibbons'
statement].
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discriminatory access aspect of the open skies doctrine was simply a policy decision which it is free to change without jeopardizing the overall
freedom of the skies aspect of the open skies doctrine." 9 Whatever the
resolution on the dissemination question, there appears to be no objection
to some form of continuing oversight to ensure private owner/operator
compliance with United States foreign policy objectives and international
agreements whether by a notice and reporting requirement or by licensing and regulation. 0
Although there are no specific answers to the Working Group's in-

ternational law questions relating to prior consent posed by Principles
XIII, XIV and XV, the most consistently applied policy has been the
United States open skies doctrine, along with its provision for open, nondiscriminatory access to data. Additionally, the United States proposals
in the land remote-sensing Working Group have stressed regional sharing of land remote-sensing data to promote a common development of
knowledge about a region,8" and that such data should be made available
to interested states, scientific communities and others on an "equitable,
timely and nondiscriminatory basis."8 "
79. Interview with Lisle Rose, Department of State (Dec.5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Rose Interview]. A Washington Post article of September 28, 1983, stated that the Reagan
Administration had decided to abandon the open skies doctrine by allowing private satellite
companies to "keep secret some satellite data they collect and sell it under exclusive contract
to one country or company." Hilts, Administration to Allow Exclusive Pactson SatelliteData
Sales, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1983, at AS, col. 1. During the Landsat Hearin&supra note 12,
Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) asked J. Dexter Peach, Director, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office, if he was familiar with
the news story. Mr. Peach responded: "That is clearly the understanding that we [GAO] have
gotten from all the material we have seen developed by the State Department position and in
terms of the understandings we have gotten from the official of our Government with whom
we have talked." Id. at 57.
80. Rose Interview, supra note 79; LandsatHearing,supra note 12, at 6 (statement of J.
Gibbons).
81. This is also consistent with the agreed upon consensus on Remote-Sensing Principles
IV and VI, supra notes 35 and 37.
82. Id. art. V at 103. Source Evaluation Board (SEB) Chairman, Ray Kammer, noted
that the Administration will only encourage "open skies." It will neither require nor demand
it. He implied that backing away from "open skies" was necessary to prevent a competing
company or host State from securing the same data under the nondiscriminatory access provision. 3 WASH. REMOTE SENSING LETTER, No. 5, at 2 (Sept. 1983). In the same article, the
editor commented upon Mr. Kammer's remarks by noting:
The implication is that foreign operators have already backed away from the "open
skies" policy, and by not following suit our U.S. operators would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage. However, the French (with SPOT) and the Japanese (with
ERS-1) have emphatically stated that they will adhere to the "open skies" policy.
Also, Dr. Radford Byrely stated his opinion that both the French and the Japanese were
looking to see if the United States maintained open skies, and would probably follow which-
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With the international law void in the area of land remote-sensing,
states have been operating on an ad hoc basis, with only a few scattered
bilateral agreements. The most comprehensive set of bilateral agreements are probably the current Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's)
between the United States and the foreign Landsat ground station operators. These agreements, along with the Landsat data sale agreements and
RFP's "Model MOU,' '83 require the foreign ground station operators to
provide Landsat data to all requestors on a nondiscriminatory basis. A
ten-year United States reliance on the MOU's may be transforming its
transnational business law practices into a basis for customary international law. The end result is that from a customary international law
standpoint the United States would be hard-pressed to deny the precedential value of its reliance on the open skies doctrine-a practice of its
own creation.
D. Developing Country Sovereignty Over Wealth and Natural
Resources
There is a substantial body of United Nations resolutions relating to
the sovereignty of a developing country over its natural wealth and resources. The formal genesis is General Assembly Resolution 626 of
1952, the preamble of which states that, "the right of peoples freely to
use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their
sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purpose and Principles of the
Charter of the United Nations." 4 Two recommendations are set forth in
the preamble:
1. Recommends that all Member states in the exercise of their
right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic
development, have due regard for the maintenence of the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic co-operation among nations;
2. Further recommends that all Member states refrain from acts,
either direct or indirect, which impede the exercise by any state of sovereignty over its natural resources.8 5

The United States voted against Resolution 626 because it did not
ever path the United States took. Interview with Dr. R. Byrely, Jr., Science Consultant, House
Committee on Science and Technology (Dec. 16, 1983).
83. RFP, supra note 8, app. C.
84. G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (1952), reprintedin STEINER AND VAGTS, TRASNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 345 (1976).
85. Id.
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recognize under international law the rights of private investors in expropriated property. In 1962 the General Assembly adopted Resolution
1803, "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources." 6 The United
States voted with the majority on Resolution 1803. The preamble to Resolution 1803 notes in part that "the creation and strengthening of the
inalienable sovereignty of states over their natural wealth and resources
reinforces their economic independence .... ."I The second declaration is the most relevant to land remote-sensing:
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as
well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes,
should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities
[emphasis added]. 88
In 1966, 104 countries voted in favor of General Assembly Resolu-

tion 2158, also entitled "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," which further declared that the United Nations should
urdertake a "maximum concert[ed] effort" to assist developing countries

in exercising their "inalienable right" of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.89 The United States abstained principally over provisions
granting developing countries partial expropriation rights in the advantages and profits derived by foreign enterprises from the exploitation of
86. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) (1962), reprintedin partin STEINER AND VAGTS, supra note 84 at 345.
87. Id. at 464.
88. Id. (emphasis added). Other General Assembly Resolutions contain similar language
recognizing the principle of "inherent right of sovereignty over natural wealth and resources:"
1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Article 1.2 provides:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
Id. at 49. According to Article 25, "[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources." Id at 51.
2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316. Articles 1.2 and 47 repeat the language of Articles 1.2 and 25, respectively, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Id. at 53, 57.
3) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Territories,
G. A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1966). One of
its preamble paragraphs essentially repeats the language of Article 1.2 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Id. at 66.
89. STEINER AND VAGTs, supra note 84, at 346-47.
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natural resources within the developing country. The United States ex-

plained its abstention on the grounds that it "favor[ed] the resolution's
recalling and reaffirming resolution 1803."90

United States support for Resolution 1803 was withdrawn in 1974
when the principle of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources"

became inextricably intertwined with language requiring "restitution and
full compensation [from foreign enterprises] for the exploitation and depletion" of natural resources within developing countries. The occasion
for this parting of the minds was General Assembly Resolution 3201,
"Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (NIEO), and the related Resolution 3202, "Programme of Action
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order."', The

United States Ambassador to the United Nations explained that United
States withdrawal of support for provisions about permanent sovereignty

over natural resources resulted from NIEO's failure to require compensation for foreign enterprises whose investments were expropriated. He
indicated, however, that "[t]he governing international law cannot be

and is not prejudiced by the passage of [the] resolution."9 It can thus be
argued that the United States may still support the principle of perma-

nent sovereignty over natural resources as the principle was originally
93
understood.

E. The Free Flow of Information and Global "Informatics"
As indicated in the previous discussion of the open skies doctrine,
90. Statement by Ambassador James Roosevelt, Alternate United States Representative
to the 21st Session of the General Assembly, appearing in Press Release No. 4987 of the
United States Delegation, November 25, 1966, reprintedin partin STEINER AND VAcTS, supra
note 84, at 347.
91. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-IV) and 3202 (S-VI), Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974). The two basic approaches to
the NIEO concept are: (1) a formula for nonreciprocal preferential treatment of developing
countries; and (2) a redistribution of resources and income which would favor developing
countries at the expense of industrialized countries, and which would be instituted by interna.
tional agencies and regulations. See Horn, Normative Problems of a New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 338, 340 (1982). The article is also a good source for the
argument that the NIEO concept is self-defeating.
92. STEINER AND VAGTS, supra note 84, at 345. Ambassador Scali's remarks are repro.
duced in 13 I.L.M. 744 (1974).
93. The United States has continued to abstain from or vote against further United Na.
tions resolutions relating to economic rights and duties-despite included provisions for permanent sovereignty over natural resources-because of a failure to "[define] equitably and take
into account the concerns of industrialized as well as of developing countries." Remarks by
United States General Assembly Representative, Senator Charles Percy, DEPT. OF STATE
BULL., Feb. 3, 1975, at 146, reprintedin part in STEINER AND VAOTS, supra note 84, at 468.
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the nondiscriminatory access aspect of the doctrine emanates in part
from the free flow of information language of Article 19 of the United

Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.94 In his article on
"teleinformatics," 95 Eger notes: "[A]lthough the document is not a legal
instrument, it is part of the fabric of international law and is widely understood to be the foundation for the principle of a free flow of information between nations.",96 The result was a political declaration espousing
a right to information, entitled the "New World Information Order."9 7
Regardless of whether the developing countries characterize the free

flow of information between nations as a right, the activity of telecommunicating is rapidly becoming characterized by both developing and
developed nations as information transport. The emphasis is shifting

away from telecommunication media, such as radio or wire, and is being
placed on the information transported. Moreover, aside from the act of

communicating, the subject of communications-information-is rapidly
becoming a commodity, both as an intermediate good and as a good of
final consumption. 9s

Land remote-sensing is included in the debate over the juridical status of telecommunications and information because it relies principally
upon telecommunications equipment and its data has commodity and intelligence value. 99 The RFP approach to United States land remote-sensing reflects the United States preference for viewing each
telecommunications activity as independent of other activities relying ex-

clusively on marketplace development of operational systems. Both of
these United States preferences run counter to the bulk of world practice.
94. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
95. EGER, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformati=" An Introduction, 14 Co.NEL
INT'L L.J. 203, 207-208 (1981).

96. Id. at 207-08.
97. Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Political Declaration, 31 U.N. GAOR (197th plen. mtg.) 43, U.N. Doc. NAC/CONF.5/S.2 (1976).
The NWIO declaration states in part:
The emancipation and development of national information media is an integral part
of the over-all struggle for political, economic and social independence for a large
majority of the peoples of the world who should not be denied the right to inform
and be informed objectively and correctly. Self-reliance in sources of information is
as important as technological self-reliance, since dependence in the field of information in turn retards the very achievement of political and economic growth.
Id.
98. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Long-Range Goals in
International Telecommunications and Information: An Outline for United States Policy 16
(Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NTIA Report].
99. See discussion of commodity and intelligence value of land remote-sensing data infra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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Much of the rest of the world, including the developed countries of Western Europe, Japan and Brazil, view land remote-sensing as but one facet
of an overall governmental information policy. This view is labeled "informatics." The United Nations Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics defines informatics as the "rational and systematic application
of information to economic, social and political development." ' t°° The
purpose of an informatics policy is to tailor a national plan governing
computer and telecommunications development and information utilization to achieve national goals and serve national interests. The United
States has treated telecommunications and information in a piecemeal
fashion, resulting in overlapping agency jurisdiction and inconsistent and
self-cancelling results. The net result is that the United States has been
slow to gain bureaucratic momentum and has thereby been outpaced by
foreign unified informatics policies.101
In the case of the Landsat program, while it has been under the
aegis of NASA and NOAA, the remainder of the world has felt some
measure of assurance that its use would be consistent with United States
support of the free flow of information. The commercialization proposal
is viewed by some as an abandonment of a portion of the United States
policy commitment to the free flow of information with no guarantees
that prior policies will be maintained. In light of the absence of a United
States informatics policy it is extremely important that development of
such a policy "be thoughtfully formulated and defensible in international
forums."102 Given the tendency of many developing countries to employ
the same diplomat to negotiate a wide range of issues, "on a very personal, as well as a substantive level, what is said in one forum carries over
into others."103 Accordingly, it is extremely important that United
States officials also speak with "one voice."
The other United States departure from world practice is its reliance
on market forces to shape a competitive model for basic telecommunications transmission facilities and telecommunications services. "In most
countries, telecommunications facilities are owned and services are controlled by the government, and the interests of some government-owned
post, telegraph, and telephone entities has hindered the development of
100. Cited in EGER, supra note 96, at 205.
101. NTIA Report, supra note 98, at 11. The NTIA Report is an excellent general reference on this problem and spares few harsh words for the lack of a United States informatics
policy.
102. OTA Memorandum, supra note 71, at 41.
103. Id. at 103, app. A (based in part on discussions with Marvin Robinson, former chief of
the Outer Space Affairs Division of the United Nations, 1983).
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open markets."'" The principal impact of this factor on the proposed
commercialization of United States civil land remote-sensing is that competing foreign land remote-sensing systems unquestionably will be provided with some measure of government-sponsored operational support.
This will directly impair the ability of United States private firms to compete in an increasingly protectionist world market which has viewed past
Federal Communication Commission decisions as "arbitrary" and "without regard for the views held in a distant country."' 0 5
F.

Open Skies Versus Prior Consent Principles

From a practical standpoint, any assertion of unlimited sovereignty
to control the activities of remote-sensing satellites will force the dismantling of the present remote-sensing programs as well as preclude the initiation of other programs. 0 6 In objecting to being remotely-sensed
without prior consent, the objecting states claim an infringement upon
their inherent right of permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources in violation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 626.107 According to some critics of the prior consent principle, the
focus upon the act of gathering and disseminating remote-sensing data
appears to be misplaced because there is no potential for an invasion of
sovereignty until the sensed state is somehow impeded in the exercise of
its sovereignty over the use and management of its affected natural resources. This group advances a theory that state sovereignty is not compromised until a holder of remotely-sensed data attempts to exploit the
sensed resources by seeking to extract them. At that point, the sensed
state is able to effectively protect its sovereign interests in its resources.' 8
Several factors tend to support this argument:
(1) The nondiscriminatory access aspect of the open skies doctrine guarantees the sensed state independent access to the data without having to
rely on the representations of those seeking to exploit their resources;
(2) The United States-sponsored Landsat system is superior to any current private venture, both in scope and quality, thereby providing the
104. NTIA Report, supra note 98, at 8.
105. Holzberg, The New World Information Order. A Legal Frameworkfor Debate, 14
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 415 (1982).
106. Hopkins, supra note 41, at 97-98. See also discussion of open skies policy supra notes
67-83.
107. For a discussion of sovereignty over wealth and natural resources see supra notes 8493 and accompanying text.
108. Interview with William Bishop, Chairman, (Landsat) SEB and Joseph Levine, General Counsel, SEB (Nov. 1983); Rose interview, supra note 79; interview with Dr. Rndford
Byrely, Jr., supra note 82.
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sensed state with otherwise unavailable, precise information about its
resources;

(3) Although such action is not endorsed by the United States, the affected state has the option of instituting a selective boycott against the

company which is remotely sensing them or a secondary boycott against
the users of the data;

(4) Since there is no "actual" imposition upon their sovereignty until an
enterprise seeks to exploit the resources, the sensed nation can, prior to
agreeing upon a proposal, demand, and get, all data-remotely-sensed or

otherwise-upon which the enterprise is basing its decision to exploit the
resources; and
(5) The private operator is not operating in a totally unregulated void.
Under Article VI of the Space Treaty of 1967 the United States is to be
responsible for all objects placed into outer space, whether by a government agency or private concerns within the United States.
1. Commodity and Intelligence Value of Land Remote-Sensing
Data

The overall limitation on the position advanced above is that it focuses entirely on the potential extraction value of the sensed resources.
It ignores the commodity value of the sensed resource site in relation to
other "unsensed" resource sites and the value of the remotely-sensed
data itself. To a lesser extent, it also ignores the value of the data to the

intelligence community. Commodity value, in this instance, is the value
of information relating to natural resources based upon supply and demand factors.1 0 9
109. To put into perspective the explanation of commodity value in the text above, an
example is helpful. Country A, as far as the rest of the world knows, has X amount of a rare
metal at one site. The world price of that rare metal reflects a shortage in supply and Country
A has enjoyed a healthy rate of exchange from its sale, although several other countries supply
the same rare metal. Unknown to the rest of the world, there are two other sites in Country A
which together contain three times the amount of rare metal. Both Country A, and its neighbor, Country B, who has two times the amount of the rare metal in existing sites, know this,
and have agreed to keep it secret so that they can maintain a high price for the metal, Given a
static amount of the rare metal in the ground, it is in their best interest to deplete the rare
metal over the longest period of time in order to maximize their rate of return on the nonrenewable resource. Accordingly, Country B has agreed to limit its extraction of the metal to
the same rate at which Country A extracts its metal.
While a remote-sensing satellite is passing over Country A, it detects the other two sites.
As soon as the satellite operator confirms this, he makes it known to the world without first
informing Country A. The price on the rare metal plunges on the commodity markets. Country B, fearing the worst, reneges on its agreement, immediately dumps its reserves of the metal
on the market before the price declines any further, and steps up its extraction efforts. Meanwhile, the value of Country A's existing developed site drops, it suffers heavy foreign exchange
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By providing remote-sensing data to a third country (whether directly on an exclusive basis or indirectly on a nondiscriminatory basis),
the provider, in effect, is also providing that country with possibly valuable strategic intelligence information which could be exploited by armed
force or by political propaganda.110 Although the information may have
only limited intelligence value to the sensing country, it may, nonetheless, be information which the sensed country has a legitimate national
interest in keeping from its neighbors.
Because of the commodity value of remote-sensing data as it affects
the commodity value of natural resources and because of its intelligence
value, release of the data without consent may interfere with a sensed
country's (1) national plan of resource development and exploitation;
(2) national economic plan; (3) national foreign exchange plan based
upon the commodity value of the affected resources; and/or (4) national
strategic planning concerning resources that are in short supply and are
needed for the sensed country's strategic purposes or which are of great
strategic value to another country.1 11 It is irrelevant that the release of
data was done in an open, nondiscriminatory manner; the "prior consent" principle does not seek equal access, it seeks to screen access.
An additional argument against the prior consent principle is advanced by those who support dissemination of land remote-sensing data
on an exclusive basis, without granting nondiscriminatory access. Their
argument views the sensed state as a seller of the sensed resources who is
free to bargain at arm's length, has no real need for the data and will
ultimately learn of its contents from a potential buyer during business
negotiations. The argument assumes that the data will be made known
losses and is close to defaulting on a development loan. The market stabilizes when Country A
refuses to develop its two other sites, but it has suffered heavy losses in the interim.
If Country A was consulted prior to releasing the data, nothing would have changed,
since it would have still probably chosen not to develop the additional sites. Although the
market value of the rare metal may have declined slightly in relation to the additional known
reserves, the intervening economic turmoil could have been prevented if Country A had been
given an opportunity to announce its original intentions relative to the newly "discovered"
sites.
110. This issue is stressed in the OTA Memorandum:
Private ownership of the land remote-sensing system may heighten suspicions that
data would be used to enable interests outside the sensed country to gain a competitive advantage, or that information on crop conditions or military activities of States
might be sold preferentially to political adversaries. The developing countries are
particularly concerned about this issue, since many lack the indigenous ability to
analyze the data.
OTA Memorandum, supra note 71, at 40.
111. A contrary argument is that stability of world commodity markets is more likely with
full information on geographical and agricultural condtions which affect the level of supply.
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to the sensed country. This, however, may not occur if the owner of the
data chooses not to act on it. Furthermore, it assumes that someone
other than the sensed state is in a better position to determine what data
is relevant.
A state can engage in activities relating to its sovereign functions
outside of its territorial limits, such as procuring foreign development
loans from public or private lenders and engaging in commodities trading
and currency exchange. Naturally, a state wants to procure the most
favorable terms for loans and the best markets for its commodities and
currency. If a private or public lender, commodities broker or money
broker were allowed to purchase land remote-sensing data on an exclusive basis, without the consent of the sensed state, the ability of the
sensed state to deal at arm's length would be prejudiced by the fact of
superior information being placed in the hands of another. Similarly, if
the data was obtained without the consent or the knowledge of the sensed
state, it would not know if the one with whom it was dealing was unjustly
enriching himself based upon superior information, or incorrectly quoting terms based upon misinformation.
2. An International Right of Sovereign Privacy
Requiring consent prior to dissemination grants the sensed country
some measure of an international right of sovereign privacy: the ability
to withhold information about itself from the rest of the world.
Although the remote-sensing satellite operator knows the information,
the sensed countries are legitimately concerned that a third party could
make decisions based on data which may have a substantially devastating
impact upon their national economic and strategic planning and then
request that it not be further disseminated without their knowledge or
consent. Even though developed countries are quick to dismiss the prior
consent argument and the related right of international sovereign privacy, neither concept is a perspective unique to developing countries,
There are instances in which developed countries share similar concerns
over who knows what about them and what they are doing with that
information. 112
112. To illustrate this point, the same issue arises in the case of transborder data flows
(TDF). Canada, a major developed economic power, is concerned about the inviolability of
data upon its citizens stored in the United States. Medical information about Canadian citizens is retained by United States insurance companies. Canadian census and economic forecasting-related information is retained in data banks in the United States. Canada is concerned
about another sovereign having access to information which is the basis for national planning
efforts, and is one of several countries seeking to pass data protection laws to prevent the
"unauthorized" use or release of such data. See generally Gotleib, supra note 41. The Cana-
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Taken to its logical extreme, an international right of sovereign privacy would also preclude use of remote-sensing data by the country
which conducted the sensing activity. There are inherent difficulties in
switching a remote-sensing satellite on and off as it passes over designated land areas. Requiring consent prior to dissemination recognizes
this technical difficulty but seeks to preclude effective use of the data,
either by interstate or intrastate dissemination of the data. Notions of
practicality, however, tend to dictate a more moderate position. The
more moderate position on requiring consent prior to dissemination of
remote-sensing data would allow the sensing state to utilize the data in a
manner made known to the sensed state, and preclude further interstate
and intrastate dissemination unless the sensed state's consent is first obtained. The efficacy of even this moderate position will tend to be eroded
in the wake of multiple new entrants into the remote-sensing field. If
each nation were free to make use of data obtained by its satellites, their
agreements to seek the sensed state's permission prior to further dissemination would be of limited utility if the intended beneficiaries of the secondary data already had primary data gathering capability.
Given the likely inefficacy of a sovereign privacy approach, sensed
states which prefer a prior consent regime can pursue one of two paths.
They can return to the unenforceable, hard-line approach of requiring
their consent prior to being sensed or they can acquiesce to the fact that
they will be sensed pursuant to the open skies doctrine whether or not
they consent. Under either alternative, it is still in the sensed state's best
interest to consult with sensing states regarding anticipated or actual occasions when a legitimate state interest could be jeopardized by un11 3
restricted dissemination of the data.

V. UNITED STATES POLICY ON LAND REMOTE
SENSING BY SATELLITES
Pursuant to the RFP, the United States Government is prepared to
grant private operators exclusive ownership of all data produced by the
dian position on TDF is remarkably similar to the argument advanced by the developing nations on remote-sensing data-that its consent, or the consent of its individual citizens to
whom the data may pertain, must be obtained prior to the release of the data. The distinction
between TDF and remote-sensing data is that TDF has a greater tendency to directly infringe
upon the personal privacy of a State's citizens or business entitites. Land remote-sensing, however, is viewed as less intrusive on personal privacy. Moreover, its limited image-resolution
capabilities in relation to true "spy" satellites represent a minimal intrusion on sovereign privacy because of its limited strategic value.
113. The second alternative is an aspect of an international rule of practicality, discussed
infra section VII.B..
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follow-on commercial system (but not the Landsat system), subject to
outstanding foreign ground station obligations. Commercial operators,
however, are required to:
(1) Conform. .. earth remote-sensingprograms as closely as is commercially possible to traditionalUS. Government practicesofproviding
civil land remote-sensing satellite data to all users on an open, equal,
nondiscriminatorybasis.
(2) Consult with and obtain the approval of the U.S. Government
before instituting major changes in international data processing and
distribution practices, to ensure that such changes are in conformity
with the international obligations and foreign policy objectives of the
U.S.; and
(3) Describe how United States Government agencies may obtain sufficient land remote-sensing data to meet their space114technology assistance and other international programmatic needs.
What is readily apparent from the highlighted language in the portion of the RFP quoted above is its restatement of the most critical question: whether it is, in fact, commercially possible to maintain
international policies and practices that the United States has maintained
in international forums. Any departure from the most basic policies,
such as adherence to the nondiscriminatory access aspect of the open
skies doctrine, will be considered a radical change in United States foreign policy.
A.

United States Foreign Policy and Commercial Success of Land
Remote-Sensing

The central foreign policy issue of the Landsat commercialization
proposal is whether the United States practice of achieving foreign policy
objectives via its civil land remote-sensing program is compatible with
the commercial success of a private venture. 115 Concern has been expressed that the United States would be turning a valuable foreign policy
tool over to the private sector, 11 6 thereby making necessary a second
Landsat system, owned and operated by the United States, to meet defense, intelligence and foreign assistance needs so as to avoid reliance
upon foreign-supplied land remote-sensing data. 1 7 This argument, how114. RFP, supra note 8, § VI.2.1.
115. Landsat Hearing, supra note 12, at 7 (Gibbons statement). Representative Jack
Brooks (D-Tex.) stated that the foreign aid value of Landsat data outweighed much of the
traditional foreign aid through commodities. Id. at 2.
116. Landsat Hearing,supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Rep. Frank Horton (D-N.Y.)).
117. Landsat Hearing,supra note 12, at 8 (Gibbons statement).
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ever, has not persuaded the General Accounting Office to preclude

commercialization.""
Despite a substantial period of United States adherence to the open
skies doctrine, the intent of the RFP is to determine "whether changes in
current international arrangements would make good business sense and,

therefore, we feel we should not legally obligate mandatory compliance
with them."1' 9 The RFP is administered by the Source Evaluation
Board. In response to the question of whether continued adherence to
the open skies doctrine would have an adverse effect on commercial op-

portunities in land remote-sensing, a Source Evaluation Board spokesperson responded, "[a]t this time there are no business plan data that
permit an accurate answer to this question."12 0
118. Interview with Lisle Rose, State Department (reinterviewed Dec. 21, 1983). Also note
a statement by Harry R. Marshall, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, who said:
In view of future uncertainties as to how civil remote sensing from space will be
conducted by a variety of international operators, the Department of State has concluded, following consultations with other responsible agencies, that the best policy
to pursue at this time with respect to practices demanded of a prospective private
Landsat commercial operator should be one of common sense flexibility. Our policy
is to encourage a private sector operator to maintain Landsat data processing and
provision on an open non-discriminatory basis. We believe it unwise to prematurely
burden an operator with prior constraints at the outset that may place him at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis his international commercial rivals.
3 WASH. REMOTE SENSING LETrER, No. 5 (Sept. 1983), at 1.
119. LRS Act Hearing,supra note 4, at 633 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Jr.,
Chairman, Source Evaluation Board (SEB) for Civil Space Remote-Sensing). On March 6,
1984, the current SEB Chairman, William P. Bishop, testified as follows at a Congressional
hearing:
The administration is concerned about the requirement in the [Landsat Act] that
data from commercial operational systems be made available on a nondiscriminatory
basis. While this has been the Government's practice in the past, we are not convinced that the same principle should apply to a commercial venture.... We have,
of course, encouraged the bidders to adhere to past Government practices in this
regard. We recognize that requiring data from operational systems [to] be available
on a nondiscriminatory basis would be appropriate for as long as the Government
continues to own the system.
Hearing to Review H.R. 4836, The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984,
Before the Subcomm. of Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the
Subcomm. on Space Sciences andApplications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of William P. Bishop). (Unpublished Hearing notes
available from Subcomm. on Space Sciences and Applications).
120. LRS Act Hearing,supra note 4, at 634. This portion appears to be contrary to the
great weight of previously expressed opinion from the private land remote-sensing data user
community. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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1. Exclusivity Versus Nonexclusivity of Remote-Sensing Data
One of the principal arguments against the continuation of open,
nondiscriminatory access to land remote-sensing data is that the primary
value of such data lies in exclusive rights to its use. This issue is presently the central focus of the debate over the Landsat commercialization
proposal. Such focus is misplaced and is counterproductive to the proper
development of an integrated land remote-sensing data market, which
would include value-added services such as image enhancement and interpretation. Moreover, this argument is not borne out by the great
weight of testimony from the United States private-user community. As
early as 1979, during hearings on a bill to establish an Earth Data and
Information Service,121 private users expressed opinions that: (1) improved information capability outweighs any benefit a state may gather
in commodity markets through information monopoly; 122 (2) the lack of
sensor optimization for geologic purposes and stereographic capability
emphasized its provision of nonoptimum data for natural resource exploration;1 23 (3) the value of remote-sensing data lay not in "raw data," but
rather in the enhanced and processed image; 124 and (4) redundancy and
overlapping could be avoided.' 2 5
The strongest show of support from the United States private users
of remote-sensing data comes from a Geosat Committee t2 6 resolution
supporting the open skies doctrine. The Committee is comprised of approximately 100 geological resource companies from the United States
and abroad which produce more than one-half of the United States nonrenewable energy and mineral resources. 27 In drafting its resolution, the
Geosat Committee relied heavily on the positions of the Civil Operational Remote-Sensing Satellite Advisory Committee, chaired by Michele
T. Halbouty (the Halbouty Committee), a study group commissioned by
the Department of Commerce to consider the role of the private sector in
121. S. 663 and S. 875, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
122. Operational Remote Sensing Legislation: Hearings on S. 663 and S. 875 Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) 1278 (statement of Dr. Klaus P. Heiss, President,
Econ. Inc.).
123. Id. at 282 (statement of Jon Davidson, Superior Oil Co.).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 307.
126. The Geosat Committee was founded in 1976 and is comprised of international oil, gas,
mineral and geological engineering industry representatives. The Committee's objective is to
present the views of industrial users of land remote-sensing data to United States and foreign
governmental entities. LRS Act Hearing,supra, note 4, at 580 (statement of Dr. Frederick B.
Henderson III, President, Geosat Committee, Inc.).
127. Id.
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civil remote-sensing by satellites. 128 The Geosat Committee initially expressed the following concerns: (1) that a premature effort to commercialize could jeopardize the United States civil remote-sensing system;
(2) that a cooperative effort would be more successful than polarizing the
government and the private sector interests; and (3) that the Landsat
system ownership status was of little concern so long as a strong civil
land remote-sensing system is maintained in the United States. 2 9
The Geosat Committee "believe[s] the United States and the rest of
the world have benefited enormously from the 'Open Skies' policy set
forth and maintained by the United States for over the last two decades."
The Committee views "[i]nternational cooperation on the exchange of
civil land remote-sensing data [as]. .. the only logical economic path to
follow. '1 30 It looks beyond the United States system and sees the need
for cooperation and compatibility between national systems as being necessary to the development of a global system. In order to avoid an expensive, proliferating intelligence arms race to develop nationalistic land
remote-sensing systems to further compete for world resources, the Committee believes it necessary to maintain the open skies doctrine. By doing
so, it suggests that the land remote-sensing satellite systems "would remain in the international civil community for the benefit and in the best
interest of all." Finally, the Committee finds the proprietary concerns of
operators to be sufficiently protected under current international copyright laws and legal standards of "group shoot" practices. t3 '
128. Two panels were formed. The first was a subgroup of the Halbouty Committee, no
member of which had a vested interest in ownership or operation of the Landsat system. The
second was an interagency government panel, not chaired by NOAA or Commerce. After
reviewing both panels' comments, the Secretary of Commerce met with the President's Cabinet
Council, which in turn recommended a stated national policy on remote-sensing for federal
agencies to implement. 2 WASH. REMOTE SENSING LErrE, No. 5 (Sept. 1982), at 1.
Neither of the two previous panels endorsed the rapid Landsat privatization envisioned by
the Reagan administration. Of special concern was the inability to provide data at reasonable
costs and possible disruption of continuous Landsat data service due to a lack of a definite
commitment to continue the program if a private owner/operator's "best efforts" failed.
Marsh, Reports Criticize Plan to Sell Satellites, AVIATION W. & SPACE TECH., April 4, 1983,
at 48.
Despite these internal reports, the Department of Commerce recommended proceeding
with the sale effort. This recommendation was criticized by Senator Slade Gorton (R-Washington) for its secrecy on the proposal: "[The Secretary of Commerce's] refusal to consider
counsel from the Congress and from within his own department led to the unfortunate recommendations upon which the President's decision [to commercialize both Landsat and Metsat]
was made." Reprinted in AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., April 18, 1983, at 30.
129. LRS Act Hearing,supra note 4, at 580 (Henderson statement).
130. Id. at 584.
131. Id. For a discussion of "group shoot," see infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
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2. The "Group Shoot" Analogy
The term "group shoot" describes a geological surveying procedure
whereby a consortium of "prospectors" sponsor a single overflight and
"shooting" of the ground below. Each member is then free to analyze
the raw data and make arrangements to conduct a terrestrial survey or
sounding, either individually or as a group. Once favorable resource conditions are confirmed, each member is free to arrange to exploit the resources, either individually or by joint exploration. The "photographer,"
depending upon his contract, is generally free to resell the data to third
persons.
By analogy to "group shoot" practices, nondiscriminatory access to
data can be viewed as a global "group shoot" in which any person is free
to examine the data so long as he pays the "photographer;" thus the
phrase "you pay your money, you get your pixel."' 32 Although the commodity value of exclusive information is lost, each shot's value will lie in
its superiority to a competing shot. Accordingly, economic self-interest
will compel competing land remote-sensing satellite operators to provide
the best product by continually upgrading their technical capability to
meet the competition.
In order to forestall objections to sequestering data and providing
discriminatory prior access, a readily adcessible national or global reporting and cataloging system should be maintained on a first-come, allserved basis. This procedure relieves the satellite operator of the burden
of providing land remote-sensing data to each sensed state. Depositing
land remote-sensing data in such a data bank would preclude the withholding of information about a state's resources because each state would
be free to monitor the data bank's holdings and request copies as needed
on a nondiscriminatory cost basis. Also, any tendency to overprice data
would be diminished by the normal supply and demand process. This
procedure is similar to the one being debated in the latter half of Land
Remote-Sensing Principle XIII,'33 but differs in that notice is provided
after the fact. Providing prior notice, as required by the first part of
Principle XIII, would be prejudicial to the unrestricted overflight aspect
of the open skies doctrine. Finally, a dispute resolution procedure, along
the lines of Land Remote-Sensing Principle XVII, 34 should be available,
if for no other reason than to perpetuate the fairness aspect of open skies
132. "Pixel" refers to a series of "dots" which converge to form a visual image, generally
on a cathode ray tube. Each pixel, the minimum element of Landsat data, represents 1.1 acres
on the ground. OTA Memorandum, supra note 71, at 53.
133. See supra note 61.
134. See supra note 66.
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which is the foundation of open, nondiscriminatory access.1 35
3.

Government Land Remote-Sensing Data Needs and
Commercial Viability: A Functional, Two-Tiered
Analysis

Another aspect of predicting commercial success of a private Landsat system operating under the open skies doctrine is that certain government needs are not commercially viable. A functional method of
analyzing commercial viability is to look at land remote-sensing data
needs as residing in one of two tiers. First-tier needs are commercially
viable markets generally related to nonrenewable resources for which a
large user community would request multiple shots, multiple copies and
extensive value-added processing. Second-tier needs are commercially
nonviable markets generally related to renewable resources, and climatic
and agricultural conditions requested by governments or international
agencies on a frequent basis, for a single user who generally has the capability to perform his own image enhancement and processing.1 36 Remote-sensing R&D cuts across both tiers with need for both first-tier and
second-tier R&D. Much of the United States data requirements are for
experimental uses, economic development analysis, earth sciences applications and cartographic studies. The price charged to commercial users
would prohibit the gathering of large amounts of land remote-sensing
data for these purposes.
The second-tier data, although available under the nondiscriminatory access aspect of the open skies doctrine, may, as a practical matter,
be unavailable to requestors. A private land remote-sensing data provider will be motivated by economic self-interest to conduct special purpose "shots" on a speculative basis for first-tier data markets. A similar
motive for a nonspecific, second-tier governmental market would not exist; this would necessitate government commissioning of "shots" to provide a relevant data base. The major areas for the utilization of remotesensing capabilities are the same areas that would generally fall within
the second-tier data market: (1) repetitive monitoring of agricultural
crop yields, damage and infestation; (2) evaluation of rangeland conditions; (3) identification of changes in forest-product production from natural and human impacts; (4) monitoring of water resources;
(5) identification of adverse changes in rural and urban habitation pat135. See discussion of "fairness aspect" infra section VII.B.
136. See LRSAct Hearing supra note 12, at 555 (statement of Peter Thacher, World Resources Institute).
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terns; (6) monitoring of natural or artificial changes in the environment;
and (7) identification, evaluation and monitoring of marine and coastal

resources. 137 In addition, there are global programs which rely on continuous, inexpensive data. Such programs include the World Conservation
Strategy,13 the World Soils Policy,' 39 studies of the greenhouse effect

based upon the World Glacier Inventory, 4 and various United Nations
programs aimed at combating world hunger and promoting economic

self-sufficiency.4 These programs are designed to improve the welfare
of entire populations or the state of humankind and are incapable of having a price tag placed upon them. Resolution of this dilemma lies in
either the establishment of a national or global land remote-sensing data
system for second-tier data or sufficient state and intergovernmental or-

ganization funding of general purpose, repetitive land remote-sensing by
the commissioning of shots through private land remote-sensing data
providers.

Establishment of a national or international land remote-sensing
data system or commissioning general-purpose shots, or a combination of
both, would properly focus commercial competition on resource ex-

ploitation rather than information exploitation. This focus would allow
private land reniote-sensing data providers to gain proprietary rights to
first-tier data and still retain government control over second-tier data

related to national and global objectives. In this manner, it would be
assured that land remote-sensing activities from space would be "carried

out for the benefit and
in the interests of all countries, irrespective of
142
their development."'

The RFP grants the owner/operator of the commercial follow-on
system "ownership" of all data collected. To the extent that the grant
includes second-tier data, serious consideration should be given to making such ownership subject to a United States land remote-sensing sys137. 126 CONG. REC. 103,338 (daily ed. May 7, 1980) (statement of Sen. Schmitt).
138. The World Conservation Strategy is a conservation policy statement prepared by the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, in conjunction
with the United Nations Environmental Programme. LRSAct Hearing,supra note 136, at 555
(Thatcher statement).
139. The World Soils Policy is a policy statement prepared by the United Nations Environmental Programme aimed at preventing erosion and deforestation. Id.
140. The World Glacier Inventory is a United Nations Environmental Programme,
UNESCO and Swiss Federal Institute of Technology joint project. The project is "developing
a World Glacier Inventory based on work in 750 glacier stations in 21 countries. When completed in 1985, it will serve as a baseline against which future changes in glacier masses due to
climactic changes can be assessed." Id.
141. Id. at 555-57.
142. Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 34, art. I.
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tern. Such a provision would give assurance to the international user
community that their developmental and monitoring land remote-sensing data needs will continue to be met after the expiration of the current
Landsat program at an affordable price. Obviously this decision would
have to be based upon the value the United States places upon the foreign
policy benefits of land remote-sensing, a value historically underrated by
the General Accounting Office, an agency responsible for the monitoring
of government spending and not the development and implementation of
foreign policy.
4. Liability and Commercial Viability
The RFP's liability section provides a routine "hold harmless"
clause which absolves the United States from all liability relating to "all
suits or damages of any character whatsoever resulting from injuries or
damages sustained by any person or persons or property by virtue or
performance of this contract . .
This particular provision, under
transnational law practices, may be unacceptable to a private owner/operator because of his potential liability for consequential damages resulting from the use, misuse or sequestering of data.
A private owner/operator may be protected to some extent by a
"waiver of sovereign immunity" clause for purchases by governments
and their agencies." 4 This would remove the sovereign act shield from
the government so that any private owner/operator or injured third person could bring suit against the government for its negligent actions,
breaches of contract, etc. It would not, however, protect the owner/operator from potential liability for consequential damages to an affected
third country or third persons not privy to its agreement, especially
where such damages may be argued to be reasonably foreseeable and
".

143. RFP, supra note 8, § V, art. XI, Harmless From Liability:
The Contractor shall hold and save the Government, its officers, agents and employ-

ees, harmless from liability of any nature or kind, including costs and expenses to
which they may be subject, for or on account of any or all suits or damages of any
character, whatsoever resulting from injuries or damages sustained by any person or
persons or property by virtue or performance of this contract, arising or resulting in
whole or in part from the fault, negligence, wrongful act or wrongful omission of the
Contractor, or any subcontractor, his or their employees, agents, etc.
See also Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 52.247-21 Contractor Liability for Personal
Injury and/or Property Darmage, 48 C.F.R. § 52.247-21 (1984).
144. This is a clause in a contract between a private enterprise and a governmental entity in
which the entity agrees not to assert as a defense to the contract or to suits arising out of it
immunity from suit because its acts were "sovereign acts." Acts to be covered are generally
considered to be acts of a commercial nature, Le., not an act capable of being performed only
by a sovereign, such as waging war.
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avoidable. Potential liability for uncertain and as yet undefined new torts
which may arise from a land remote-sensing operation must be considered as a business risk by a potential owner/operator. Private owner/
operators are unlikely to have the negotiating leverage necessary to exact
a "hold harmless" clause from either the United States or a foreign government, thereby relieving the putative plaintiff of liability for unforeseen
torts. They may, however, either include this cost in the price for data as
a cost of doing business or seek reimbursement.
The RFP's Model Memorandum of Understanding includes a
model "hold harmless" clause that private land remote-sensing operators
are encouraged to use with all data purchasers: "[The seller] does not
warrant the suitability for any purpose of [Landsat] data, and shall not
be liable for any damage or injury brought about by the use of the [Landsat] system."14' 5 This clause may need to be modified for special-purpose,
first-tier data, but should specifically state that the warranty for fitness
for a particular purpose extends only to the original contracting party.
Subsequent resales or speculative "shot" data should be sold "as is" to
the greatest extent commercially possible. As for second-tier data, private owner/operators should seek assurances from the governmental
principal that it will indemnify them from liability for any use the government makes of the data.
Although the RFP takes the position that the United States Government "would prefer to buy the data over the counter as the need for data
arises," the international community of sensed states expects the United
States to ensure that the remote-sensing activities of its nationals are carried out in a responsible manner in accordance with Article III of the
Space Treaty of 1967.146 Additionally, the United States attempt to
avoid state responsibility for the actions of its nationals via the "hold
harmless" clause may prove to be without international legal effect. It
can be argued that the United States cannot legally divorce itself from
the activities of a closely regulated private operator of a previously governmental system, based upon either: (1) general liability under an expansion of Article II of the Liability Convention; 4 7 or (2)specific
145. RFP, supra note 8, at app. C-6, para. 3.
146. Space Treaty of 1967, supra note 34. Article III provides that acts be carried out,
"[i]n
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international coopcration and understanding."
launching state
147. Liability Convention, supra note 35. Article II provides that, "[a]
shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the
surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight." A Senate report highlights the unique liability
problem:
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liability in relation to data gathering activities of a commercial nature.

Although there are no cited instances of damage caused by land remotesensing activities, 148 it can be said that in the instance of a private Land-

sat owner/operator it is a tort waiting to occur (or to be created).
5. Foreign Landsat Ground Receiving Stations
Through the lifespan of Landsat 5, any owner/operator must obtain
the concurrence of the United States Government "before terminating or
initiating agreements with an existing or prospective foreign ground sta-

tion operator." 49 Owner/operators of a commercial follow-on system,
however, "are not required to maintain or develop foreign ground receiving stations."' ° The General Accounting Office conducted a survey of
the governments of states which currently have Landsat ground station

agreements. 15 ' Those states are concerned generally with the potential of
the proposed sale for: (1) "data sales (dissemination) policies contrary to

their economic or national security interests;" (2) "termination of direct
satellite transmissions to their ground stations or changes in the satellite

signal, requiring expensive ground station alterations;" and (3) "increased prices forcing reductions in data purchases."' 52 Representatives
of developing countries have stated that their governments would object

if a private commercial operator changed the policy of open, nondiscriminatory access to data; that providing land remote-sensing data on an

exclusive or preferential basis would place developing nations at an unfair economic disadvantage; and that as sensing satellites became more

sophisticated they could be used to gather and distribute military intelligence information harmful to the national interests of the sensed naInternationally, such a transfer would appear to place the United States in a theoretical dichotomy. It will have given certain direct rights and privileges it has enjoyed
under international law to the private commercial interests of its citizenry while still
being primarily liable for a wide array of adverse effects that might emanate from the
exercise of those rights.
SENATE SPACE REPORT, supra note

6, at 23, 26.

148. Gorove, supra note 41, at 13.
149. RFP, supra note 8, § VI.3.1.
150. Id.
151. Current Landsat foreign ground stations are located in Mar Del Plato, Argentina;
Fucino, Italy; Alice Springs, Australia; Tokyo, Japan; Cuiaba, Brazil; Hartebeestohek, South
Africa; Prince Albert, Canada; Kirund, Sweden; Hyderhad, India; and Bangkok, Thailand. In
addition, a station is being established in Djakarta, Indonesia; an agreement concluded for a
station in Beijing, China; and negotiations are under way with Romania, Upper Volta, Ecuador, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Iran. RFP, supra note 8, § VII.3.2.4.2.
152. Landsat Hearing,supra note 12, at 53 (prepared statement of J.Dexter Peach, Director, Resources, Community and Economic Development Division, General Accounting
Office).
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tion.1 53 India maintains that "surveillance and remote-sensing are but
two faces of the same coin." '5 4 Brazil views Landsat as both a valuable
and a dangerous instrument.1 5 5 Argentina expressed the position of eight
Latin American states that countries which operate ground stations
should be assured of "continued access to data and technical assistance
in the modification of ground
station modifications required by technical
' 156
satellites."
the
in
changes
Many developing countries consider that their investments in current ground stations would be compromised by either any modification
of the Landsat 4/5 transmission linkage which prefers the TDRSS 5 7 network over foreign ground stations or by a raise in user fees unrelated to
operational costs solely to provide a reasonable profit to a commercial
operator. These nations assert that this would result in an infringement
upon United States guarantees of open, nondiscriminatory access-guarantees they too are required to give to others as a part of their ground
station agreements with the United States.

VI.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE RFP AND LAND
REMOTE-SENSING

The battle lines between the United States Commerce Department
and Congress over the RFP were clearly drawn by Representative James
H. Scheuer of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment. Chairman
Scheuer stated:
Three months ago, when our joint subcommittees began organizing
these hearings, I said that the Administration needed to satisfy several
Congressional concerns before it began the process of transferring
satellites to the private sector ....
Regrettably, these concerns have
yet to be met ....
[T]he Administration must take a position before
153. Id. Landsat 4/5's Multi-Spectral Scanners (MSS) provide high resolution images of
land areas no smaller than 80x80 meters square and its thematic mapper of areas no smaller
than 30x30 meters square. Generally, within the intelligence community, a high resolution
image of an area 0lx10 meters square or smaller is necessary for an effective intelligencegathering capacity. There is a tacit understanding that such sensors will not be placed aboard
the Landsats because: (1) images of an area smaller than 10 meters square is unnecessary for
resource and agricultural surveying; and, (2) data processing technology is currently not sophisticated enough to process the data for "real time" usage. Interview with Joseph Levine,
supra note 108.
154. Landsat Hearing, supra note 12, at 54 (Peach statement, citing Indian Government
statement).
155. Id. at 54-55 (citing Brazilian Government statement).
156. Id. at 55-56.
157. See infra note 188 for a description of TDRSS.
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it considers issuing an RFP to industry ....
[T]he proper method is
by open discussion of framework legislation, not by issuance of an
RFP which will draw a response from a select group of commercial
entities [as opposed to a general public response]. 1 58
Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota stressed the need to decide the
commercialization issue as soon as possible, so as to get to the "real"
issues: (1) Landsat data continuity; (2) foreign competition and dependence; and (3) United States support for technological advancement in
15 9
remote-sensing.
Now that land remote-sensing is again on the Congressional agenda,
examination of past and current legislative initiatives relating to the role
of government in remote-sensing will be helpful in examining the merits
of the RFP. In considering the role of government in any activity, especially land remote-sensing, the following is the general framework for
appraisal: (1) subsidies and financing mechanisms (including purchase
guarantees, buy-back mechanisms, direct subsidies and R&D support);
(2) maintenance of United States competitiveness abroad; and (3) avoiding fostering competition with itself."6
Congressional interest in remote-sensing did not begin with the current Landsat Act. A major legislative proposal, initiated in 1979 by former Senator Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, called for the
establishment of a federally sponsored, private Earth Resources Information Corporation (Earthsat).' 61 The corporation was to be organized
along the lines of Comsat, the federally sponsored satellite communications company, and to be regulated by the Federal Communications
Commission.62 Regarding the open skies doctrine, the Commission was
to "insure that all persons and organizations, domestic and foreign, shall
have nondiscriminatory opportunity to purchase Earth resources information ...
,,"6 The only limitation upon the open skies distribution
policy was a provision for controls on scientific advances in Earth imaging technology from space. Even these controls had to be "justified and
158. LRSAct Hearing,supra note 4, reprintedin 2 WASH. REMoTE SENSING LErrER, No.
22 (June 1983), at 1.

159. Id. at 3.
160. This Article does not cover in depth the general area of federal regulation ofcommercial space activities. For such treatment, see SENATE SPACE REPORT, supra note 6; Dula,
Regulation of PrivateCommercial Space Activities, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 156 (1983); Galloway,
The Role of Congress in Space Law and Policy, 11 J. SPACE L 35 (1983).
161. S. 875, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
162. Id. § 102(d).

163. Id. § 201(c)(2). Purchases were to be "underjust and reasonable prices, charges, classifications, practices, regulations and other terms and conditions .... "
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assessed in relation to civil benefits, national security and foreign policy.""' The bill also required steps to insure that United States land
remote-sensing data needs for general governmental purposes were met
at a "just and reasonable price," except for "unique governmental
needs," which would be supplied from a separate earth resources
infor165
mation service, the Earth Data and Information Service.
Congressional interest in Earthsat and Earth Data Information Service diminighed with the departure of its most knowledgeable and vocal
advocate, Senator Schmitt. Not until the controversy surrounding the
66
Comsat proposal to purchase Metsat together with the Landsat system
did specific remote-sensing legislation reemerge. To forestall what some
considered an executive infringement upon legislative authority, the
NASA Authorization Act of 1984 prohibited the "transfer of ownership
or management of any civil land, meteorological, or ocean remote-sensing space satellite system and associated ground system equipment"
without a comprehensive plan and Congressional approval. 16 ' The proposed sale of Metsat formally expired with President Reagan's signing of
the appropriations bill for the State, Justice and Commerce Departments
on November 28, 1983. Under the bill, the government was prohibited
from soliciting bids or otherwise proceeding on a sale of the Metsat satellites.168 Representative Scheur said that Congress had been sending signals to the executive branch that it might approve a "long-range gradual
phased privatization" 6 9 of the Landsat system, if reasonable justification
170
for such a sale was provided.
The most recent Congressional initiative was enactment of the
Landsat Act. 17 ' The Landsat Act posits specific findings, including one
that United States remote-sensing "affects international commitments
and national security concerns." 172 Among its stated purposes is to
"preserve [United States] national security, and fulfill United States in164. Id. § 201(a)(8).
165. S. 663, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). See also S. 3589 and S. 3599, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
166. See supra note 7.
167. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, supra note 19.
168. Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1983, at A1O, col. 1
169. Id. at col. 5.
170. Id.
171. Landsat Act, supra note 9.
172. The "Findings" of the Landsat Act include the following:
FINDINGS
Sec. 101. The Congress finds and declares that
(1) the continuous civilian collection and utilization of land remote-sensing data
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ternational obligations."' 7 3 The stated policies are:
(a) It shall be the policy of the United States to preserve its right
to acquire and disseminate unenhanced remote-sensing data.
(b) It shall be the policy of the United States that civilian
unenhanced remote-sensing data be made available to all potential
users on a nondiscriminatory basis and in a manner consistent with
applicable antitrust laws.' 74
(c) It shall be the policy of the United States both to commercialize those remote-sensing space systems that properly lend themselves
to private sector operation and to avoid competition by the Government with such commercial operations, while continuing to preserve
our national security, to honor our international obligations, and to
functions that are esretain in the Government those remote-sensing
175
sentially of a public service nature.
From the outset, the Landsat Act limits the scope of the Secretary of
Commerce's authority to "contract for the operation of part or all of the
from space are of major benefit to managing the Earth's natural resources and in
planning or conducting many other activities of economic importance;
(3) the national interest of the United States lies in maintaining international
leadership in civil remote-sensing and in broadly promoting the beneficial use of remote-sensing data;
(4) land remote-sensing by the Government or private parties of the United
States affects international commitments and policies and national security concerns
of the United States;
(8) the private sector, and in particular the "value-added" industry, is best
suited to develop land remote-sensing data markets;
(11) the time is now appropriate to initiate [Federal Government/private industry] cooperation with phased transition to a fully commercial system;
(12) such cooperation should be structured to involve the minimum practicable
amount of support and regulation by the Federal Government and the maximum
practicable amount of competition by the private sector, while assuring continuous
availability to the Federal Government of land remote-sensing data;
(13) certain Government oversight must be maintained to assure that private
sector activities are in the national interest and that the international commitments
and policies of the United States are honored; and
(14) there is no compelling reason to commercialize meteorological satellites at
this time.
Id. § 101.
173. Id. § 102(2).
174. Id. § 104(3)(A). "The term 'nondiscriminatory basis' means without preference, bias,
or any other special arrangement (except on the basis on national security concerns pursuant
to section 607) regarding delivery, format, financing or technical considerations which would
favor one buyer or class of buyers over another. Id.
175. Id. § 103.
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[Landsat] system, so long as the United States Government retains

(1) ownership of such system; (2) ownership of the unenhanced data; and
(3) authority to make decisions concerning operation of the system," 11 6

For the follow-on commercial system, these provisions are consistent
with the originally announced "policy for a decade. .. [to] provide for
the private sector to take177an increasing responsibility in remote-sensing
'
and other applications."
Given the current "sputtering" performance of Landsat 4178 and the
Reagan administration's intent to abandon production and launching of
Landsat satellites after Landsat 5, the RFP is viewed best as a solicitation
to the private sector to salvage a land remote-sensing system that the

United States could, but will not, maintain. Also, Landsat 4/5 is primarily oriented for R&D applications by providing operational data for com-

mercial use. This fact, along with the negative political stigma over the
Metsat controversy, could cause financial circles to view any investment

in the current Landsat system as a commercial liability. 179 Accordingly,
it would appear that the emphasis in the Landsat Act upon "operation"
is more consonant with experience prior to the RFP; that no one wants

to purchase the Landsat system "as is," even if it were for sale. An implied condition within the Landsat Act is that any Landsat system con-

tractor who desires to sell processed or enhanced (value-added) land
remote-sensing data must do so through an organizationally separate

unit. 8 ° Also, any data sales to such unit must be paid for on a nondis176. Id. § 201(b).
177. President's Fact Sheet, United States Civil Space Policy, (October 11, 1978) reprinted
in CHRISTOL, supra note 41, at 904.
178. SCIENCE NEws, August 13, 1983, at 100. "The status of Landsat 4, in fact, has deteriorated to a matter of waiting for the end." Id.
179. LRS Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 600 (statement of Don C. Walklet, President,
Terra-Mar and commercial investor's representative, Land Remote-Sensing Satellite Advisory
Committee, Department of Commerce). Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) stated: "TiThey
[the administration] paint a rosy picture on this. But if they sold it to me, goodhearted as I
am, I'd wring every dollar out of it." Satellite Sale Opponents Finding Support, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 3, 1983, at 18.

180. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 402(b)(9)(B), "if such [value-added] activities are to be
conducted, [the licensee must] provide the Secretary [of Commerce] with a plan for compliance with the provisions of this Act concerning nondiscriminatory access." What is left unstated in this provision is that compliance with the Landsat Act's nondiscriminatory access
provisions include the provision that it also be made available "in a manner consistent with
applicable antitrust laws." See id. § 103(b). This implies that the enhanced services segment of
any Landsat operator must be an organizationally separate unit. The term to describe this
requirement is "unbundling," and is similar to that in the telecommunications industry
whereby AT&T was required to establish a subsidiary for its "enhanced services" activities
separate from its "basic transmission service" operation. Computer 11 Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). The evil sought to be avoided is "cross-subsidization," by which a Land-
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criminatory basis without any favoritism as to access or early receipt., 1
There is a reason for this apparent digression to discuss the valueadded market for land remote-sensing data. Any preoccupation with the
operation and management of the Landsat system's hardware assets
draws away from the real purpose of involving the private sector in civil
land remote-sensing, which is discovering the efficient and practical way
to disseminate land remote-sensing data. Less attention should be placed
upon "unloading" operation of the satellites onto the private sector and
more attention placed on ways to stimulate a value-added market for
land remote-sensing data which, in turn, would provide the incentive for
private companies to build and launch their own land remote-sensing
satellites.
The land remote-sensing data value-added industry holds the greatest commercial potential in the remote-sensing industry. Given similar
levels of sensor technology, the only distinction in value between one
provider's land image and another's is the ability to make one image
"more relevant" than the other by image processing, enhancement and
interpretation. The Geosat Committee views the value-added industry as
one which "clearly can expand and become commercial now."' 8 2 For
purposes of nondiscriminatory access the Landsat Act draws the line at
"unenhanced data," which means "unprocessed or minimally processed
signals or [original] film products collected from civil remote-sensing
space systems."' 8 3 The term "unenhanced data," for purposes of nondiscriminatory access, "does not include conclusions, manipulations, or calculations derived from such signals or combination of the signals with
other data or information."18' 4 The Geosat Committee agrees with the
"point of access" definition and expresses no objection to the separate
subsidiary requirement for value-added services.'
The general line of
opinion from the commercial sector appears to be that the market for
sat operator would sell raw data from its satellite operation to its enhanced services operation
at marginal prices, while at the same time, charging market prices to outside purchasers. The
result is that its enhanced services operation would be able to compete unfairly with outside
enhanced service providers who are paying full price. This separate subsidiary requirement

assumes some degree of monopoly position in the raw data basic transmission services. As
more enterprises enter the market with their own satellites, the resulting competitive market
forces would preclude further application of a separate subsidiary requirement.
181. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 601(a).
182. LRS Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 585 (Henderson statement).
183. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 104(4). "Such minimal processing may include rectification of distortions, registration with respect to features of the Earth, and calibration of spectral
response." Id.
184. Id. § 104(4).

185. See supra note 175.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol, 7

land remote-sensing raw data is not yet ripe but that government support
and encouragement of the value-added industry could eventually enable
its enterprises to "reverse integrate" from providing value-added services
to providing raw data."8 6
Another departure of the Landsat Act from the terms of the RFP
relates to the effect of a turnover of the foreign ground station agreements to the private sector. Under the current concept of the RFP, the
ground station agreements will expire after a transitional period upon the
transfer of the management and operation of the Landsat system to a
private owner/operator.18 7 The new owner/operator must renegotiate
the agreements and may choose not to renew them if he or she can show
that an alternate method is superior.'
The Landsat Act provides that
any agreement in force at the date of the resulting Act will remain in
force for the life of the term stated therein. At the expiration of those
agreements, and for all foreign users, data must be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.I 9
Another very important concern over the possible commercialization of Landsat system is the continuity of land remote-sensing data during the period of transition. The Landsat Act provides for "data
continuity for six years after the practical demise of the space segment of
the [Landsat] system . . .functionally equivalent to the multispectral
data generated by the [Landsat] 1 and 2 satellites . . . at an annual volume at least equal to the Federal usage during fiscal year 1983. " 191 The
186. LRS.Act Hearing,supra note 4, at 585 (Henderson statement).
187. Interview with William Bishop and Joseph Levine, supra note 108. Only the ground
station agreements, not the physical facilities, would be turned over to the private owner/
operator. The physical facilities are owned by the foreign recipients of the Landsat data.
188. The issue of a superior alternate method arises out of the fact that currently the foreign ground stations form a vital link in the ability of the Landsat system to receive the Landsat 4/5 signals without significant interruption. Without the foreign ground stations, an on.
board signal recorder must store the gathered images until it passes within range of a United
States receiving station. An "alternate superior method" would be a system which provides
continuous signal reception without relying on the foreign ground stations as transmission
links. The superior alternate system contemplated is the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS).
The TDRSS network, in its final form, will be a ring of four satellites stationed high
enough above the Earth so that it will be possible at all times to transmit information from any
one point on the Earth to any other point on the Earth (even directly opposite points on the
globe) by sending signals to and receiving signals from the network. Once TDRSS is fully
operational, reliance on foreign ground stations which are uniquely configured to receive
Landsat, and not TDRSS, data, would be uneconomical and redundant.. If such occurs, the
foreign ground station operators seek assurances that they can still receive direct broadcasts of
Landsat data in a form compatible with their equipment, independent of the TDRSS network.
189. Landsat Act, supra note 9, §§ 205(a), 205(b).
190. Id. §§ 301(a), 301(b).
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Geosat Committee disagrees to the extent that it prefers the baseline for
data continuity to be drawn at the thirty meter by thirty meter resolution
thematic mapper-type data, rather than the eighty meter by eighty meter
resolution multimission modular spacecraft-type data, to avoid a threeyear expected gap in the provision of thematic mapper-type data under
current plans. It places the blame on the Office of Management and
Budget for opposing Landsat development past Landsat 5. Rather than
depend on foreign sources of thematic mapper-type or equivalent data,
the Committee stressed a commitment to push for upgraded thematic
mapper-type sensors on Landsat 5 and Landsat 6.191
Although the RFP provides for a period of transition,19 2 it does not
address the contingency of no commercial interest in the Landsat system.
The RFP should not be faulted for this; its purpose is to solicit proposals,
not to speculate on its failure to do so. Its stated intent not to pursue the
Landsat program after Landsat 5, however, only adds to user uncertainty
and apprehension. On the other hand, the Landsat Act specifically provides that if no acceptable bids are received, "the Secretary [of Commerce] may assure data continuity by procurement and operation by the
Federal Government of the necessary systems, to the extent provided in
advance by appropriation Acts." 93
In recognition that the United States is responsible for all activities
of its nationals in space, the Landsat Act goes beyond the RFP and provides for a licensing procedure whereby all land remote-sensing data
providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United States must obtain licensing approval under the cognizance of the Department of Commerce. 194 Licensed private operators are required to operate under the
guidelines of national security policy and United States international obligations, including the provision requiring access to unenhanced land
remote-sensing data on a nondiscriminatory basis. 195
There is a firm commitment to remote-sensing R&D in the Landsat
191. LRS Act Hearing,supra note 4, at 582-83 (Henderson statement).
192. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
193. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 303(d). In fact, seven firms submitted bids. Out of the
seven bidders who responded, however, only three were given serious consideration: Eastman
Kodak, Space America and a joint venture between Hughes Aircraft and RCA Corporation
named Eosat. When the Office of Management and Budget quantified the ceiling on the
amount of subsidy that the Government was willing to give to a successful bidder at S250
million, Eastman Kodak and Space America were eliminated from consideration by the Secretary of Commerce upon the recommendation of the Source Evaluation Board. Interview with
Larry Heacock, Director of Satellite Operations, NOAA, and former Executive Secretary or
the Landsat Source Evaluation Board, Mar. 20, 1985.
194. Id. §§ 401-406 (Title IV).
195. Id. §§ 402(b)(1), 402(b)(2).
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Act. NASA, NOAA and other agencies are authorized to continue remote-sensing R&D, conduct experimental space remote-sensing programs including applications programs and develop remote-sensing
technologies in support of their authorized missions.196 The Geosat
Committee asks the United States to take the lead in "providing high risk
exploratory R&D," because military R&D will not trickle down fast
enough to meet foreign R&D efforts. 1 9 7 Under the Landsat Act all experimental data obtained by any federal R&D program will be made
available to the public to the extent national security interests are not
compromised on an "en bloc" basis "to any United States entity which
will market that data on a nondiscriminatory basis." 19
Other miscellaneous provisions provide for: (1) archiving of both
public and private land remote-sensing data for immediate or potential
public benefit;199 (2) securing proprietary rights in land remote-sensing
201
data by private system operators; 2°° (3) satellite launch services;
(4) penalties and remedies for noncompliance with licensing regulations;202 (5) radio frequency allocation for private, non-Landsat operators;203 (6) an interagency consultation procedure with a provision for
contractor reimbursement for costs incurred as a result of conditions imposed by national security interests or international obligations; 204 and
(7) an absolute prohibition against any present or future effort to commercialize the Metsat system.20 5
In summary, the Landsat Act sets forth a comprehensive national
plan for the operation of public and private land remote-sensing; the
RFP is limited in scope because it is only a framework for negotiations.
The Landsat Act shifts the focus away from commercialization of land
remote-sensing and the Landsat system, and instead stresses conducting
land remote-sensing operations for the greatest public good. When it is
196. Id. § 501.
197. LRSAct Hearing,supra note 4, at 582-83 (Henderson statement). The "trickle down"
effect relates to commercial benefits which can be derived from government-sponsored R&D,
Much of the United States' land remote-sensing R&D, however, has been for intelligencegathering purposes. The resulting technology is classified and therefore unavailable to the
commercial sector until its release does not pose a threat to United States national security
interests.
198. Landsat Act, supra note 9, § 503.
199. Id. § 602.
200. Id. § 603.
201. Id. §§ 304(a)(5), 604.
202. Id. § 403.
203. Id. § 606.
204. Id. § 607.
205. Id. §&701, 702.
&.,C1
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signed into law, it may reduce the RFP to the status of an academic
exercise or a "dry run" for a new RFP.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The RFP is more than a mere solicitation for bids for the operation
and management of the Landsat system; it is also a solicitation for comments on the overall viability of a commercial land remote-sensing venture. The most productive result of the RFP may not be the successful
solicitation of a commercial offer for the operation and management of
the Landsat system (which may never occur). Instead the major impact
of the RFP will be the intense debate it has spawned within private, federal and international circles over the role of government and international organizations in the commercialization of civil land remotesensing.
While other nations are developing and implementing national "informatics" policies which encompass the entire spectrum of communication and information services,2 6 the United States still lacks a uniform
policy. Its approach to civil land remote-sensing has been the same as
that to telecommunications: a fragmented, multi-agency regulatory
structure which is set primarily in a response mode and sometimes generates conflicting results. What the RFP process fails to do, and what the
Landsat Act attempts to do, is to deal with civil land remote-sensing in a
comprehensive manner in the development of a national policy which
reflects all sectors of the American public, and to establish a mechanism
to retain the flow of land remote-sensing data should the private sector
decide against operating the Landsat system or initiating a follow-on
commercial system. The following are selected recommendations on the
international law and foreign policy issues posed in the RFP and the
Landsat Act.
A.

Operation, Management or Sale of the Landsat System

The satellite segment of the current Landsat system should be retained under United States Government operation, management and
ownership as a permanent R&D tool. The federal government is in the
best position to enter into high risk, experimental land remote-sensing
research. Additionally, retaining the current Landsat satellites for cooperative foreign R&D and United States university R&D would guarantee
continued access to relatively inexpensive land remote-sensing data. Operation, management, or even sale of the United States ground segment
206. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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of the Landsat system should not be precluded. The greatest value of
land remote-sensing data lies in image enhancement, processing and interpretation; therefore, sufficient economic motivation exists for private
owners/operators to operate the ground segment in an efficient and modem manner.
B. The Open Skies Principle
The United States should advocate the rule of practicality: that land
remote-sensing be conducted under open skies and that an international
regime be established to ensure that nondiscriminatory access to data is
maintained. Such fairness can be assured by: (1) approaching worldwide
land remote-sensing as a "global group shoot;" (2) allowing proprietary
rights in first-tier data; (3) establishing a system of integrated national
data banks or a global data bank from which everyone would be free to
withdraw land remote-sensing data on a nondiscriminatory basis, with
the cost of first-tier data determined by open market forces, and secondtier data on a cost-plus basis (a royalty of not more than five percent);
(4) limiting nondiscriminatory access to minimally processed data;
(5) encouraging the exchange of technical and operational data for cooperative foreign R&D on a cost basis; and (6) encouraging the development of technical protocols, similar to those in telecommunications, for
data format and transmission compatibility among differing systems.
C. Foreign Ground Stations
Current MOU's should be maintained and renewed for those countries which have made a substantial monetary investment in reliance on
continued availability of Landsat data. If the Landsat ground segment is
commercialized, the availability of alternate transmission networks
should not be a justification for cancelling foreign ground station contracts of operators who still desire to obtain direct transmission (at least
not before such operators have a reasonable time to recover their capital
investments).
D.

Role of Government

To maintain United States competitiveness with future foreign land
remote-sensing data providers, a cooperative public and private effort
should be initiated. Purely private efforts of the commercial follow-on
system operators cannot compete effectively with foreign, governmentsponsored competition unless there is a continued United States commitment to R&D support. The United States may simply allow foreign gov-
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ernments to invest their public monies in land remote-sensing satellite
systems, choosing to commit its funds elsewhere. Rather than relying on
foreign availability of civil land remote-sensing data, the United States
should commit itself to providing Landsat MSS-type data continuity until it is certain that private United States land remote-sensing data providers can meet its R&D and operational needs. For thematic mappertype or better sensors, the United States should encourage private R&D
by providing space on future Landsats and geostationary space platforms
and by providing launching and space shuttle assistance for private satellite positioning.
There should be an increased emphasis upon the foreign policy
value of Landsat. Landsat data has not only aided developing countries
in predicting harmful weather patterns and in managing their own resources; it has also served to raise the general level of awareness of growing environmental problems throughout the world. "By providing a
means for self-directed resources management, remote-sensing systems
help to create self-sufficient allies rather than technological dependents."20 7 Stated in more graphic terms, giving a man a bag of rice may
keep him full, but as foreign aid it also keeps him dependent upon his
benefactor. If, instead, Landsat data can show him a hectare of usable
land, he can provide rice for himself, which is true foreign assistance.
The United States must also determine its liability under international law for land remote-sensing activities, whether conducted by a
public system or private operators. At a minimum, it should provide
"hold harmless" protection to domestic second-tier land remote-sensing
data providers. As for first-tier providers, licensing and regulating laws
should meet the "continuing supervision" requirements of the Space
Treaty of 1967 and the "absolute responsibility" provision of the Liability Convention. In order to maintain consistency in the judicial handling
of any torts committed by private first-tier providers, the United States
Justice Department should consider representing the United States as a
"real party in interest."
For foreign actions, the State Department
should consider an "absolute espousal" rule whereby the United States
intervenes directly to protect its interests in foreign forums.
Finally, the United States will not be placed in the position of competing with itself if it adopts the position that second-tier land remotesensing data must come from its own system or from shots commissioned
by it. This position of self-reliance will require a commitment of sufficient public monies to support a United States owned second-tier land
207. OTA Memorandum, supra note 71, at 29.
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remote-sensing system or to agencies which have continuing needs for
second-tier data to commission their own shots.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As both a technology and a market, land remote-sensing has not yet
come of age. As a technology, it is primarily in the applied research
phase with operational use spinoffs. As a market, it is currently of primary value to national governments and international organizations in
gathering generalized second-tier data for developmental and monitoring
purposes, and to commercial users in obtaining a better guess as to the
location of nonrenewable resources. True first-tier operational data for
specific classes of commercial users is not yet available because such
users currently depend upon routine, periodic overflights rather than special purpose overflights of designated areas.
The greatest value of land remote-sensing is its humanitarian benefits. For the first time, states can discover vast treasures of previously
undetected resources in the most remote and inaccessible areas, can better predict and prepare for food and water shortages and the resulting
famine and disease, and can foresee many natural disasters in their incipient stages. It would be a national and global misfortune if nationalistic
concerns resulted in an international legal standard which kept such a
valuable planning and predictive tool from those who rely upon it. Even
though there are identifiable national interests which could be impaired
by the availability of the land remote-sensing, data on an open, nondiscriminatory basis, there is as yet not a single instance of recognized
harm. Despite the rhetoric, it is a fact that land remote-sensing activities
will continue to be conducted amidst the uncertainty in international
law.
Most developing country concerns relating to impairment of their
sovereignty over their natural resources and wealth are no longer viable
in light of the following factors: (1) the vast majority of the Earth has
already been photographed by Landsat and cataloged at the United
States EROS facility; (2) several developed and some developing nations
will be conducting their own land remote-sensing activities in the near
future; (3) the United States, as a proponent of a reciprocalopen skies
doctrine, is opening its skies to foreign nations to sense its territory; and
(4) the weight of opinion among the developing nations appears to be
shifting to open skies, based upon a decade of reliance upon nondiscriminatory access and its benefits. The goal of land remote-sensing is the
improvement of the human condition. This goal is best realized by con-
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centrating international legal efforts on developing a rule of practicality
to deal with the realities of land remote-sensing, rather than conducting
an irreconcilable debate over prior consent.
Those in the commercial user community who advocate the provision of land remote-sensing data on an exclusive basis do not appear to be
in the majority and should not dictate the rule of practicality. Their propriety interests in first-tier data can be sufficiently protected by traditional copyright law and an adaptation of "group shoot" practices.
Similarly, states that advocate the provision of second-tier data on an
exclusive basis are only a vocal minority. Their interests in the possible
impairment of national policies and resource exploitation can be adequately accommodated through traditional consultation and dispute resolution mechanisms.
The United States is a key figure in developing a role of practicality
in land remote-sensing because it presently is the only nation with operational satellites in use. Several other nations are waiting to see if the
United States will continue to support the open skies doctrine. The burden is on the United States to prove that the open skies doctrine, with its
provision for open, nondiscriminatory access, is more than a mechanism
to accommodate foreign state objections to land remote-sensing. The
United States must demonstrate that its commitment to the open skies
doctrine is a visible symbol of its commitment to the terms of the Space
Treaty of 1967, and that land remote-sensing is a viable instrument for
securing the benefits of space technology for all humankind.
Land remote-sensing is an essential component of a developing New
World Information Order. As such, the fruits of its technology should
be shared for the benefit of all humankind. It should not be selectively
dealt with as a mere business asset or selectively disseminated in a mercenary manner as a foreign policy tool. Instead, it should be treated as a
global resource in the same manner as meteorological and navigational
data. Land remote-sensing is a predictive planning and monitoring technology introduced to the world by the United States. The United States
must quickly recover from a policy paralysis which may allow its civil
land remote-sensing capability to perish in indecision. Any steps that the
United States takes to advance the use of land remote-sensing for the
benefit of all humankind must result from its own heartfelt determination, and not by leaning on the shoulder of foreign efforts.

